Conversations: Amish Mulmi Examining Nepal’s Relationship with China

[00:00:05] - [Speaker 0]
Namaste and welcome to Pods by PEI, a Policy discussion series brought to you by Policy Entrepreneurs Inc. My name is Saurabh Lama. In today's episode, we have Anurag Acharya, Director of Practice at PEI, in conversation with Amish Rajmouni. Amish is the author of All Roads Lead North, a critically acclaimed book that presents the history of Nepal's political and commercial ties with Tibet and China and dissects the complex story behind China's growing presence in Nepal. He has written for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Al Jazeera, Himal South Asia, India Today, and the Kathmandu Post.

[00:00:41] - [Speaker 0]
Currently, he is a consulting editor at Writer's Side Literary Agency. The two discuss Amish's examination

[00:00:49] - [Speaker 1]
of

[00:00:49] - [Speaker 0]
the history of Nepal China relationship and the underlying conditions that foster its reinvigoration. These include, among others, the rise in anti India sentiments in Nepal and the weakening of the Indo Nepal relationship. They also discussed the challenges to Nepal's pursuit of a non aligned foreign policy with India, China and The US and how Nepal could leverage its geopolitical location to further its interest. We hope you enjoy the conversation.

[00:01:17] - [Speaker 1]
Welcome to the conversation, Amish. I've closely followed your writings on China, including the much talked about book All Road, Lead North, where you have pieced together a fascinating narrative interweaving it with recollections from generational traders, mostly belonging to neighbors of Kathmandu. Tell me when and what motivated you to write about it?

[00:01:46] - [Speaker 2]
I think when you're when you're thinking about a book like this, a lot of it has to do with whether you have an interest to begin with in the subject or not. So I think the first step to writing this book was a deep interest in the Himalayan and how human interactions have shaped it, how the communities in the Himalay have interacted with each other, and to sort of present an indigenous history that is very different, that is remarkably, let's say, different from current perceptions of the Himalayan, which I believe has been shaped by British, let's say, colonial experiences. The second part is also to do with how Nepal has constantly be perceived from the perspective of its ties with India, whereas the ties with Tibet and China later have mostly been ignored. So it's not just outside Nepal, but also inside Nepal. And the final so while I was writing the book, while I was, let's say, like, thinking about how do you do I want to go about it, the automatic follow-up question is, if we are talking so much about China and Nepal today, where do we begin?

[00:02:57] - [Speaker 2]
Where can we begin from? And what has been the nature of this relationship in the past? So I think these were the questions that I when I started writing the book, these were the ones that motivated me.

[00:03:07] - [Speaker 1]
Was there an archival material that you were able to access while you were writing the book? And and if so, how well preserved are they?

[00:03:16] - [Speaker 2]
So the so the first part of the book, which is to do with Transamalan trade, which is to do with the history of, let's say, Neva traders in Kathmandu from Kathmandu were traveling to Lhasa, A lot of it dependent on oral histories as well as the archival material that descendants of these traders have themselves preserved. So that is available should you go looking for them. The second part of the book, which is about the larger relationship, the bilateral relationship between China slash Tibet and Nepal, there are there is significant academic work already out there that is being done. But at the same time, there is also a couple of digital archive that are very, very important and help me a lot. One of them was the Wilson Center archive, which carries translations of Chinese documents from the seventies from the fifties onwards.

[00:04:04] - [Speaker 2]
And for for a writer like me who does not know the language, the translations helped a lot. The CIA's declassified archives are also a treasure trove to begin with. But this is where I think it's important to acknowledge the existing work that is already being done in on the subject on the Himalay from a human geography perspective by academics today. Like, there is a lot of contemporary material that is available today, and I think more and more people are being interested in the Himalay beyond its regular, let's say, narrative or regular, let's say, perceptions. Right?

[00:04:40] - [Speaker 2]
And this is also where I think translation projects like the Arneko project are really important to sustain because what they do is not everyone understands different languages. Right? And translations allow researchers to bridge that gap, to take a look from the other side of what exactly they perceive of, let's say, historical incidents or historical moments.

[00:05:06] - [Speaker 1]
It's interesting that you mentioned Ornico project. There seems to be a new curiosity on on our side to study China, understandable given their meteoric rise over the past decades. Is there similar curiosity also on the Chinese side to study and understand Nepal? I mean, of course, beyond, you know, ERNICO project and and

[00:05:34] - [Speaker 2]
See, I I don't think I can speak on behalf of the Chinese, right, like, obviously. But from what from the public, let's say, whatever has been available in the public domain, it's pretty evident that the Chinese have a newfound interest in Nepal, not just in Nepal and in in the in the largest South Asian region as well. But the other part is also a cursory look at Chinese foreign policy will tell us that they like to emphasize shared histories and cultures, and especially if such histories suit their narratives. Right? We also know that more and more Chinese are learning Nepali and vice versa.

[00:06:14] - [Speaker 2]
That is more and more Nepalese are also learning Chinese. So there are more interactions than ever before between the two sides.

[00:06:20] - [Speaker 1]
When we talk about Nepal China relations, we tend to compartmentalize it in a very specific time continuum the post Tibet occupation and the Cold War. And of course, there are recent developments in this relationship that we will talk about in the next segment. But in your writings, you have recollected in great detail Kathmandu's ancient relations with Beijing, as well as people to people ties in the borderlands. Just how deep are those roots? I know we often talk about Nepali Tarai Madhesh's cultural relations and ties with the Indian side.

[00:07:00] - [Speaker 1]
However, not much is talked about similar ties between people on our northern frontiers. Your your writings have tried to address this gap to an extent. But tell us how important is it to understand the history and and these ancient ties to make sense of our bilateral relationship with China?

[00:07:21] - [Speaker 2]
With the Himalayan borderlands, I like to see it from a different, let's say, a civilizational perspective. So just as the Indo Gangetic Plains can be termed as a Brahminical Sanskritic civilization, the Tibetan Plateau and all regions where Tibetan Buddhism found influence could be termed as a Tibetan Buddhist civilizational world. So that's my first point. The second derives from this larger Tibetan Buddhist civilizational world. Right?

[00:07:47] - [Speaker 2]
There is a cultural affinity that derives from such civilizational influence. We had trans Himalayan trade that was sustaining itself through such ties, ethnic ties, familial ties, linguistic ties. Right? And we can see across our Himalayan region both the give and take nature of culture influences as well as the fact that despite modern infrastructure, some regions find it easier to access the Tibetan Plateau than the Nepali Hills. I'd like to quote the Humla member of parliament, Chawang Lama, who told me once, for Limi Valley residents, which is in Far West Humla, it who want to come to Kathmandu, they find it easier to cross over into Taklakot into China, come down to Mahendranagar via Lipu Lake and Kumau, and fly into Kathmandu rather than coming via, let's say, Kameh.

[00:08:38] - [Speaker 2]
Because to come down to Simicot, they will have to walk for three to four days, then take a flight from Simicot to Nepalgunj, then fly from Nepalgunj to Kathmandu. Sure. So that's sort of a, let's say, not just the geographic, but as well as the larger ethnic, let's say, affinities that both sides have. That is something that I think we have missed out on a large part of, let's say, our modern history. Right?

[00:09:01] - [Speaker 2]
The third point about why such ties are important regarding bilateral ties comes from the fact that we cannot forget China's security anxieties in Tibet, the exodus of Tibetan refugees, and the impact that has had on the nature of our ties, such as after the 2,008 anti Beijing Olympics protests in Kathmandu. So this correlates with the modern day infrastructure development by China on the other side, its aid offerings to district bordering Tibet, as well as its continued interactions with political and security officials, and its emphasis that Nepal respects the one China policy.

[00:09:34] - [Speaker 1]
So you also call this a history of continuity and lapses. What what are what were the specific political and historical events that have punctuated this relationship and and what were its consequences? You did mention about the occupation of Tibet but this is more recent event but this continuity and lapse that you mentioned, this this precedes even the the Tibetan occupation, doesn't it?

[00:10:04] - [Speaker 2]
See, a lot of it also has to do with our own as well as the Chinese, let's say, view of how ties of or how, let's say, bilateral relationships have to be taken forward beyond before the modern era, that is. Right? Before the modern era, that is about let's say, the coming of the PRC or before, let's say, Nepal before the during the Rana's. Right? There was a relationship that was punctuated pretty much.

[00:10:32] - [Speaker 2]
You you Nepal used to send five yearly missions of sorts. There were trade missions. China used to the Ching's Ching Empire used to call them tribute missions. But in any case, the semantics aside, there was there were there was communication and contact between gaps. You know?

[00:10:48] - [Speaker 2]
There were always gaps in them. And that's the thing. Right? Like, we when we think about history, we of we often tend to notice only the highs and the lows, but we forget that history often flows along quietly. Right?

[00:11:01] - [Speaker 2]
So as such, when we think about these modern landmarks of, let's say, the bilateral ties or bilateral relationship, how they have been shaped, we tend to remember things like the CIA funded Tibetan guerrilla movement or the Chinese highway from Tibet to Kathmandu. They're regarded as landmarks. No doubt, these are landmarks, but history does not always revolve around specific moments. So rather, if you take a longer perspective and analyze long term policy goals of great powers, we can see distinctive trends. For example, with China and Nepal, in the early days of the relationship, it was about securing Nepal support for China's sovereignty project in Tibet.

[00:11:37] - [Speaker 2]
It did not seek to challenge or displace any of the other powers until the India China border dispute erupted. Subsequently, as antagonist states, both tried to expand upon the influence in the country. The nature of ties with bilateral ties between Nepal and China changes post King Berendra's coronation and reforms within China as well. And then subsequently, The US China's approachment from this nineteen seventies onwards. There was a period post eighties till about, like, nineties, early two thousands where China is still, you know, sort of, I would say, not really, let's say, engaging itself in Nepal at the scale that we are seeing it now.

[00:12:17] - [Speaker 2]
But this is also a time where China is also building itself, where China where the economic reforms are really, let's say, gaining pace, and China is more inwards than any other than in recent years. Right? So you can these sort of trends that you can see when you take a longer perspective of foreign policy, you you tend to notice that, alright, great powers also have policy goals. And that is something that if we, let's say, from a small country perspective, we tend to keep that in mind. It will help us also build our foreign policy perspective.

[00:12:52] - [Speaker 1]
Yeah. That that's quite interesting that you mentioned, you know, foreign policy goals that great powers set for themselves. So this brings me to the next question where we've already debunked the myth that China is a new player in South Asia because it is not. So now let's examine the conditions that led to its reengagement in the region. When we talk about geopolitical factors in South Asia, we tend to excessively focus on the domestic factors in the host country, be it Nepal, be it Sri Lanka or Bangladesh.

[00:13:29] - [Speaker 1]
But how crucial where or still are China's own domestic factors or to say its foreign policy goals or or its even its economic interests leading to this reengagement in South Asia.

[00:13:46] - [Speaker 2]
I think that's an excellent point. Right? Studying the motivations of great power engagement or reengagement will give us a more objective sense about bilateral ties as well. So particularly with China, we know this decision to come out and assert itself as a global power has long been in the making. It's been a while.

[00:14:04] - [Speaker 2]
What has happened is under the presidency of Xi Jinping, this has been emphasized over and over. In particular, for those in neighbor in as China's neighbors, the 2013 neighborhood policy, which talked about establishing a community of common destiny, that's important to understand China's willingness to assert itself as a player in the region. But we must also know that its engagements with South Asia had begun in the first decade of the twenty first century itself. Like the Indians like to call it the string of pearls strategy. Right?

[00:14:36] - [Speaker 2]
So the second part of the question, what drives these engagements? I think while economic factors would be important for China's ties with larger markets such as India and Bangladesh, with countries like Nepal and The Maldives, my sense is that the strategy prioritizes its political influence and security interests as much as its economic heft. And we get a sense of that when China, a brief period between 02/2006, 02/2008, seemed to be left out of the rapid political developments in Nepal. It found itself at the ire end of the ire of Tibetan activists. It found itself without friends in a, let's say, post conflict scenario in the country.

[00:15:18] - [Speaker 2]
And that was a time when, I suppose, China really began to assert itself in the country.

[00:15:26] - [Speaker 1]
Well, coming to Nepal, after after 02/2013, China also became more actively here. This was also a very troubling period for the country when when, you know, the country was politically and ethnically very polarized, especially with the Indian support to the Modesto movement and and its constitutional bargains leading to the rise in the anti Indian sentiments in Kathmandu. Do you think that Nepal's domestic context itself was decisive for China regaining its foothold here or did China's foreign policy priorities that we just talked about before, did it provide sufficient motivation for a more proactive engagement in Nepal?

[00:16:15] - [Speaker 2]
See, retrospectively speaking, my sense would be that it's a combination of both. From the Chinese perspective, losing the monarchy was a body blow to the interest in Nepal. They did not have the sort of pull it reach within political parties that India had, And the monarchy was this sort of permanent establishment that the Chinese were in constant touch with and directly engaging with. Right? So that had gone.

[00:16:38] - [Speaker 2]
The second was Tibetan activism in Kathmandu was hitting close to where it was hurting for them. So they were actively seeking out friends in the Nepali establishment as well. Now in this mix, we had the Nepali Maoist who were frustrated by India's continuous attempts to keep them out of power. Delhi had its own reasons, whatever they were, but the Maoists at this time were also newcomers to the Nepali political elite establishment. We must remember that they had considered India and The US as primary external antagonists at one point of time during the civil war, and they had also reached out to China during the war as well.

[00:17:13] - [Speaker 2]
It's a different matter that the Chinese did not, let's say, respond. But when we think about it, you know, about, let's say, ten years down the line, I would say a combination of both domestic outreach on part of the Maoist and other left leaning forces arising out of Delhi's perceived micromanagement of Nepali politics and China's own winning influence in Nepal. All of these combined to allow China to regain its foothold in the country?

[00:17:40] - [Speaker 1]
Right. That that's a fair point. Now looking at the Nepali side, of course, managing the geopolitical side of this relationship with China has not been easy given the open borders with India and and their keen security interest here. Past regimes and governments have leveraged the China card with various degrees of success of course. How do the Chinese perceive themselves being leveraged by Kathmandu in its bilateral relations in New Delhi.

[00:18:12] - [Speaker 1]
There must be some weariness on that side and to see their interest being reduced to a kind of a bargaining chip. Has this realization affected the way Beijing has been dealing with Kathmandu in recent years?

[00:18:28] - [Speaker 2]
Sid, I don't think they particularly like being played as a card at all. If I remember correctly, I think there was an op ed in the Global Times in 2016, which made it very, very evident that the Chinese, let's say, at least the Chinese strategic community and supposedly, I would argue, the leaders or the political leadership as well did not want to be played as a card in Nepal. Right? And now but the other side of it is this is my my personal belief is that it is high time that Nepal itself must stop playing the China card. It has to instead think about foreign policy or rather a bilateral relationship that goes beyond political influence.

[00:19:10] - [Speaker 2]
Right? It it has to create avenues where bilateral and multilateral relationships are not sustained vis a vis countries, but rather with countries in partnership or, let's say keeping Nepal's own let's say economic or other interests in mind. But that's another matter. So

[00:19:30] - [Speaker 1]
Yeah. I mean, this also bring brings us to, like, ponder upon the constant comparison on our side between the two neighbors with India's looming presence due to of course its geographical, cultural or political ties which is often seen as irritant, almost a destabilizing element. But at the same time China was always perceived as a more benevolent neighbor. I use the term was because the image seems to have taken a hit over the last few years, hasn't it? Especially after their pronounced role in bringing the communist forces in the country together.

[00:20:10] - [Speaker 1]
But tell us what gave China this image among Nepalese in the first place?

[00:20:16] - [Speaker 2]
A couple of factors, I would say. The first would be the the Chinese aid projects created a narrative that gave the impression that such projects were solely for the Nepali people and intended to break Nepal's economic dependence on India. Right? The second would be the Chinese diplomatic language and delivery mechanisms that emphasize and continue to do so Nepal's sovereignty and independence so that China could be seen in contrast to India's perceived interference within the domestic sphere. The third, I would say, is a careful cultivation of sociopolitical and economic influence in in Nepal that seeks to emphasize these above points along with China's own interest in the country.

[00:21:02] - [Speaker 2]
And the last would be a soft power diplomacy that has created a public narrative which is favorable to to its own interests and influence. So all these factors combined have allowed China to gain a positive, let's say, perception in the country. Like you said, it is it is remarkably, let's say, withdrawn or rather remarkably taken a hit in the over the last few years. But that's another factor. Right?

[00:21:31] - [Speaker 2]
The more a great power exposes itself in a democracy, the more it will be critiqued. Whether that's US, whether that's India, whether that's China, that does not matter. The the the as long as, let's say, there is a democratic setup within a particular country, such critiques will come no matter who, let's say, or who or which great power is engaged in the country as long as they are exposing themselves largely like, you know, the more they expose themselves to the general public, the more such critiques will come out. You

[00:22:07] - [Speaker 0]
You have been listening to PodsBapAI. I am Saurabhlama. This is a quick reminder to all of you to do us a favor by sharing us on social media and leave a review on Spotify, Apple, and Google Podcasts, or wherever you listen to the show. More from our guests when we return. Welcome back to Pause by PEI.

[00:22:34] - [Speaker 0]
I'm Saurabhlama. Let's get back to the show.

[00:22:39] - [Speaker 1]
So when when Nepal signed multiple treaties with China a few years back, I mean there was a trade and transit treaty and there was a BRI related treaty, there was a kind of hope that this would usher in a new phase of bilateral development partnership between the two countries. There were talks about Trans Himalayan railways as well as flourishing trade and tourist exchanges that Nepal would benefit from. Five years on the body language on both sides seems to have changed. Where did things derail to to use the metaphor?

[00:23:22] - [Speaker 2]
I think alright. The the the first is obviously whether Nepal really understood what the BRI was all about when it signed the agreement. That is whether Nepal understood it was a loan mechanism and not a grand scheme unlike other including Chinese aid projects. Right? Nepal also did not have clarity about what it wanted from the BRI to begin with or what it wants from the BRI even now.

[00:23:50] - [Speaker 2]
We can it's well and good to sell a train running across the Himalayas to the, let's say, the general public, but it sounds great on paper as well. But if you have to end up spending, I think, more than 3,000,000,000 rupees per kilometer of train line, who's going to pay for it? So we can't afford that for sure. So I think the first would be, obviously, there's a lack of planning. There's a lack of, let's say, planning on certain executionable projects within the BRI's, let's say, the sphere to begin with.

[00:24:20] - [Speaker 2]
The second slowdown of the BRI also comes from a global pushback that China has itself faced with respect to its high interest loans and the perceived debt rat narrative, right, as well as China itself trying to ensure its BRI loans and projects are economically viable and sustainable. If I remember correctly, BRI loans have fallen drastically in the years since twenty eighteen, twenty nineteen. The third point over here would be Nepal's own dilemma with respect to implementing agreements. And this is not with just with China. It sign that it signs, like I mean, we tend to sign agreements with a lot of, let's say, fanfare, but when it comes to actually implementing them, there there are lots of issues that come up.

[00:25:02] - [Speaker 2]
The MCC is a great example of how this Nepali political discourse tends to critique agreements after they have been signed. So which is not which does not make for great optics for any agreement we may have to sign in the future. And finally, I think what what we also tend to deemphasize is the political nature of the bilateral relationship that we have with China. China's political investment in the Nepali communist meant its eggs were all in one basket. But anyone who follows Nepali politics knows coalitions are broken with as much ease and frequency as they are made.

[00:25:38] - [Speaker 2]
So in coming out openly for the communist, it alienated the Nepali Congress. And second, while the CCP as a party may have believed Nepali communist operate like they do, it was an entirely incorrect projection. The CCP operates as a state. So, essentially, the People's Republic Of China's legitimacy is derived from the CCP's rule itself and vice versa, and the public narrative rarely matters or is made to be inconsequential. But in Nepali politics, as in most democracies, power and legitimacy are both derived from the people, whatever the nature of the polity may be.

[00:26:12] - [Speaker 2]
This to me has been a fundamental error in in judgment on Beijing's part to assume that political parties in Nepal operate exclusively of public pressure, narrative, and influence. So I think a combination of all these factors has led to a a lot less interest in the BRI these days than it was when it was signed. So these are there are these couple of factors like these like I had mentioned, and I think it's a it's a combination of all these factors that have come together to sort of dampen the, let's say, enthusiasm around the BRI in both from both sides.

[00:26:45] - [Speaker 1]
Right. I I I think I'll I'll I'll probe you there further because you mentioned that how our political class is always, looking at these agreements in the aftermath and then sort of reacting to it rather than us being at the forefront of it planning and envisioning what kind of agreements that we want to get at. So when you mentioned that we have been very reactive to this kind of, you know, whether it it is BRI, whether it is MCC. So are you saying that a lot of the problem, whether it is MCC, whether it is BRI, the reason these kind of agreements are get into get into sort of this kind of problem is because our political class is incapable of distinguishing between the political side of it and and and the developmental side side of it?

[00:27:34] - [Speaker 2]
I wouldn't say incapable. I would say there's a distinctive lack of interest in doing so. And there is also a lack of planning from our side that is very, very visible. I remember when Xi Jinping came to Kathmandu in 2019, there was a news report that said at the dinner banquet hosted in his honor, a couple of officials were actually asking Chinese officials whether they could fund another road in the East in Eastern Nepal joining the border as part of the BRI. And the Chinese were simply like, bring this this should have been part of the earlier, let's say, whatever agreements or whatever, let's say, like, projects that you would like to have included under the BRI.

[00:28:17] - [Speaker 2]
So the other the other part of it is how many how many Chinese interpreters or translators do we have within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, within, let's say, when when Chinese dignitaries come to visit us, they bring their own translators. And this is not just with China. I mean, we need to we need to have more translators. We need to have French speakers. We need to have German speakers.

[00:28:38] - [Speaker 2]
We need to have because these are all important bilateral partners, but we don't seem to be making an effort in, let's say, expanding our own diplomatic presence or diplomatic let's say capacity in these ways?

[00:28:50] - [Speaker 1]
PI recently conducted a perception survey in Raswa and Nuwako districts where which are close to China border. There are a number of large infrastructure projects operating at different stages there involving Chinese contractors. We found that their disciplined approach to everyday work was well regarded by the locals who also admired the technological sophistication that the Chinese brought to the projects. Of course, there were grievances too, which will probably be a subject of discussion for some another episode. But I mentioned this because in your writings you have also talked about how smaller Chinese businesses are propping in Nepal's urban centers like Kathmandu and Pokhara, possibly also in Luminee and Jhapa where they are invested in developing urban infrastructures.

[00:29:41] - [Speaker 1]
Can you give us some idea about these new Chinese businesses in the urban centers? How do they contribute to local economy and what is the local perception around them?

[00:29:51] - [Speaker 2]
Okay, I'll give you examples from two case studies that let's say, I have researched or two sectors that I have researched in more detail than the others. The first is China's investments in Nepal's tourism economy. Right? China is the largest foreign investor in Nepali tourism right now. It sent the second highest tourist after India.

[00:30:12] - [Speaker 2]
And before the pandemic, it was clear that the Nepali tourist economy was quickly reorienting itself to the Chinese visitors. So we had an abundance of Chinese hotels and restaurants, Chinese speaking tour guides, including Nepalese, which learning Chinese to become tour guides, Chinese group tours coming by the dozens by the day, and Chinese diplomatic focus on Nepal's tourism sector. Right? You had the Chinese ambassador herself advertising, visit Nepal here, and things like that. However, what was also happening was the Chinese investment, although miniscule, if compared, let's say, globally, right, inside Nepal at this scale was displacing Nepali businesses and entrepreneurs in tourism.

[00:30:52] - [Speaker 2]
So it was not just due to the lower cost that they could offer to, let's say, visitors, but also because of the higher rents that they were offered. They were they offered landlords to whose places they were renting out. Then there was also the issue with the digital payments where there were allegations that Chinese tourists were making payments in through digital wallets, which are not entering the Nepali financial system. And there have been, let's say, a government policy again, a reactive government policy coming down and cracking down on it. And but post the pandemic, you don't really know whether it has been implemented, what is the really the the condition of this market at all right now.

[00:31:35] - [Speaker 2]
Right? The second case study that I would like to bring is to is about the informal trade, like informal sectors of Nepal China trade, such as the trade in Riyasa Gumba, Bodhi Chitta, Rudraksha. Right? What happened in these particular markets were that Chinese buyers captured the market by offering exorbitant rates for such produce. They I mean, I know several, let's say, I wouldn't I wouldn't I wouldn't call them farmers to begin with, but let's say, Nepali entrepreneurs, Nepali, let's say, middlemen, Nepali traders who've got very, very rich because of, let's say, the prices that Chinese are offering.

[00:32:13] - [Speaker 2]
Now once they capture the market, they lowered the prices once the supply chain had been secured. So the question here is, is Chinese economic influence in Nepal predicated on its monotonistic nature? I would hate to say a definite yes, but in such informal sectors, that seems to be the reality.

[00:32:33] - [Speaker 1]
We know China's long term interest in Nepal has always been ensuring what it calls a one China policy and preventing any upsurge in what it calls quote unquote anti China activities, especially in the light of large Tibetan population who continue to live here as refugees. But beyond the obvious, what does China's new presence in the region mean for Nepal?

[00:33:02] - [Speaker 2]
I think the first is we have to have to come to terms with the fact that China is here to stay. And it's not just in Nepal. It's in South Asia. China is a global power now, so we have to come to terms with that. So which means that we also have to come to terms with the pushback led by The US and other states that are aligned to it, as well as China's own pushback against this American narrative.

[00:33:23] - [Speaker 2]
So that is number one. The second, I think, is we will also have to prepare for how India responds to China as well. So far, it seems India has been emphasizing on connectivity in South Asia and contrasting its projects and approach vis a vis the Chinese ones. But as tensions continue to grow between the two giants, Nepal will have to prepare itself to deal with the fallout as seen as the I mean, the Indians even now believe that Nepal's new map is the result of Chinese influence. So these the there will be more such instances in the future for sure.

[00:33:56] - [Speaker 2]
So all of this means that Nepal will have to formulate a coherent foreign policy to begin with. It needs a foreign policy that goes beyond political influence and aligns itself with national economic and diplomatic interests. But as long as our national interests are seen to be aligned with the interests of our political leadership, our foreign policy will continue to flounder like a fish in a dried lake. So it will we will simply reach out to wherever there are pools of water, but we will not have any understanding of whether the fish can survive in that water or not. So you need to have a foreign policy that takes away the political, let's say, alignment or the political, let's say, preference for particular neighbors or particular ideas or ideologies and rather go ahead with a coherent continuity, a coherent foreign policy that emphasizes on continuity as well as Nepal's own national interests?

[00:34:55] - [Speaker 1]
Very, very well put and and and an interesting metaphor. We're coming to towards the end of this fascinating conversation. But before I let you go, Amish, I have to ask you about the title of your book, All Roads Lead North. It seems a bit audacious, even considering all the prospects of Nepal's engagement with China. Tell us what was it a publisher's catchphrase or do you actually believe all the roads for Nepal necessarily lead to the North?

[00:35:22] - [Speaker 1]
If you know what what you're trying to get at.

[00:35:25] - [Speaker 2]
See, okay. Two parts to this answer. Right? The first part is the more, let's say, the the critical part, which is that if you if you go to the Himalayan region or if you go to the Himalayan borderlands, it is very, very evident that the roads are leading north. I mean, at least before the pandemic.

[00:35:44] - [Speaker 2]
And all of this, but my research was conducted before the pandemic. So, I mean, that is the caveat. But it was very, very evident that there is there was new, let's say, economic activity happening on the other side of the border that was, let's say, encouraging our citizens to go and work there, to start engaging more with citizens on the other side. So and roads were leading north at that time point of time as they still are. So that is the first part.

[00:36:13] - [Speaker 2]
The second part is the political leadership in Nepal has been looking at China as to to come in as a political alternative to India's heavyweight influence. This has been happening for a very, very long time. Until now, it was China's own limitations that, let's say, could not allow it to assert itself in Nepal. But now that it has the Nepali political leadership continues to look at China as, let's say, a counter to whatever let's say, you have Indian influence, you have American influence, all these influences or great power influences, and they simply put China on one side. Alright.

[00:36:56] - [Speaker 2]
We have them to begin with. So that though, that's the more, let's say, the critical part. The more fallacious part of this argument is you it if the title got someone to pick up the book, the job was done.

[00:37:08] - [Speaker 1]
Prospects are what drive enterprising relationship. That's that's a fine note to end with. Thank you, Amish, for the engaging conversation.

[00:37:15] - [Speaker 2]
Thank you, Anurag. It was a it was indeed a pleasure. Some great questions, and I think that's the larger point. Right? Like, these are these are questions that will continue to prop up as we, let's say, engage and expand our foreign policy engagements with great powers.

[00:37:31] - [Speaker 2]
As I've been continuously emphasizing, unless we sort of put our interests, and that is the national interest rather than the political leadership's interest in it as priority, we will continue to be asking the same questions perhaps even in the next decade.

[00:37:48] - [Speaker 1]
That's that's true. Signing off from here. Good night.

[00:37:53] - [Speaker 0]
Thanks for listening to Pods by PEI. I hope you enjoyed today's conversation between Anurag and Amish on China's increasing presence in Nepal, the challenges to Nepal's pursuit of a non aligned foreign policy with India, China, and The US, and how Nepal could leverage its geopolitical location to further its interest. Today's episode is part of PEI's series on managing India, China, and The US in a new world order. It was produced by Nirjuna Rai with support from Aparna Pauryal, Kujiang, and Shantanu Nagor Koti, and the Boju Boju duo Itishak Giri and Bukkadirai. The episode was recorded at CatJazz Studio.

[00:38:28] - [Speaker 0]
Our theme music is courtesy of Sanjay Sreshta from nineteen seventy four AD. If you liked today's episode, please subscribe to our podcast. Also, please do us a favor by sharing us on social media and leave a review on Spotify, Apple, and Google Podcasts or wherever you listen to the show. To catch the latest from us on Nepal's policy and politics, please follow us on Twitter tweet2pei. That's tweet followed by the number two and PEI, and on Facebook at Policy Entrepreneurs Inc.

[00:38:58] - [Speaker 0]
You can also visit pei.center to learn more about us. Thanks once again from me, Saurablama. We'll see you soon in our next episode.