[00:00:00] Namaste and welcome to PODS by PEI. A policy discussion series brought to you by Policy Entrepreneurs Inc.

[00:00:19] I am Progate Krakhi and in today's episode we have PEI colleague Anurag Acharya in conversation

[00:00:25] with former Indian diplomat, Pankassarun on Navigating India's diplomatic landscape and inside

[00:00:31] of view. Pankassarun is a former diplomat he has served as India's ambassador to Russia

[00:00:37] and India's high commissioner to Bangladesh and as the head of the Northern Division in Ministry

[00:00:42] of External Affairs dealing with Nepal and Bhutan. He has worked in different capacities

[00:00:47] with successive Indian Prime Minister in the Prime Minister office contributing to the

[00:00:51] recent making at the highest level in a diverse range of sectors including foreign affairs

[00:00:56] and national security. Pankass is presently a convener of NADSRAD, a Delhi-based independent

[00:01:02] centre for research on strategic and security issues. He is a member of National Security

[00:01:07] Advisory Board and a distinguished fellow of the National Maritime Foundation. Anurag

[00:01:13] and Pankass explored the evolution of India's foreign policy from the perspective of the former

[00:01:17] diplomat himself. They cover recent historical landmarks from the tectonic shift in the

[00:01:22] global geopolitics during the Cold War and to India's strategic maneuver amidst the

[00:01:27] complexity of the Indo-US nuclear deal to explore how each ship India's foreign policy.

[00:01:34] With a keen focus on India's contemporary aspiration on the global stage, they explore the significance

[00:01:39] of forums like bricks and India's hosting of G20 summit in shaping its foreign policy

[00:01:45] priorities. As Pankass candidly shares his experience, the conversation also uncoveres a unique

[00:01:51] insight into the high stake, high octane life of a diplomat. We hope you enjoy the conversation.

[00:01:57] Namaste! I am Anurag Acharya.

[00:02:02] Namaskar! My name is Pankassaran. Thank you.

[00:02:06] Welcome to the conversation Ambassador Saran. Let's start the conversation with your personal

[00:02:11] journey into the foreign service. Why did you decide to join and how was your initial

[00:02:17] journey? Well firstly thank you very much Anurag for hosting me here at your podcast. It's a great

[00:02:23] privilege to be here and talk to you. It's interesting. I mean, I really didn't plan to join

[00:02:30] the foreign service as such. I was very enamored though of the whole world of international diplomacy

[00:02:36] because I happened to live close to the diplomatic and slave-entelli. As a college student,

[00:02:43] I would go there almost every day and I would see those flags flying and those beautiful

[00:02:48] buildings. I realized that there is something about this whole atmosphere which is so appealing.

[00:02:55] And then just the charm and the adventurousism involved of discovering other countries,

[00:03:01] other cultures and also being able to then not only work in the traditional sense but

[00:03:09] also to do some intellectual pursuits and understand other cultures and what makes the

[00:03:16] world the way it is. So these were basically what drove me to the foreign service. I must

[00:03:23] say I had a very romantic view of the world and of the job. I just thought it was an

[00:03:28] extremely cushy and a very privileged job. But I was somehow attracted to the whole job description,

[00:03:34] if I can put it like that because it seemed to me to combine travel, intellectual pursuit,

[00:03:40] analysis, writing, scholarship and also in the process helping your country and bringing

[00:03:50] the world closer to your country. Although as a young college kid, it was not as if one had some

[00:03:58] very fixed notions about national interest which I have today. So it was more of a discovery

[00:04:06] and an adventure. So that's why I think and how I got into this. Luckily we have a very rigorous

[00:04:14] examination and I was fairly casual about it to be honest. And I gave the exam and I always had

[00:04:23] internalized the fact that it's a very difficult exam. And if you get in, it's good. I'll consider

[00:04:30] myself lucky, fortunate. But if I don't, I'll do something else. So it was not as if it was a

[00:04:36] make or break to be honest. Sounds quite fascinating. I mean during your career spanning of four

[00:04:44] decades, you've been assigned several high profile jobs including in Russia and in Bangladesh.

[00:04:51] You've also headed the Ami's and North Division that looks at Nepal and put on. But tell us about your

[00:04:57] personal experience during these assignments and how it shaped your worldview as a diplomat.

[00:05:02] You were just mentioning about how you stepped in to the foreign service, not understanding the entire

[00:05:09] gamut of things that you were up for. But tell us how it actually shaped your worldview as a diplomat.

[00:05:15] Yeah, I realized very early on that the profession of diplomacy and the world of diplomacy

[00:05:25] was a very, very tricky and a very complicated universe. It required a very different and very

[00:05:33] specific skill sets which you had to acquire to be a successful diplomat. And then the question would

[00:05:41] always arise in my mind what is a successful diplomat? Who is a successful diplomat? And what does

[00:05:48] success mean in diplomacy? And I grew as I progressed over the last let's say four decades starting from

[00:05:57] a young diplomat. So as a young diplomat, I would simply observe seniors and how they conducted

[00:06:05] negotiations and not just negotiations even the simple act of how you dress, how you speak,

[00:06:12] how you engage other people. So it starts from the most rudimentary simple tasks and activities

[00:06:22] to the more complicated jobs of negotiating agreements, treaties, etc. So in the initial years,

[00:06:31] I mean my first assignment was Moscow. I began from Moscow. We had to learn Russian.

[00:06:36] So must we quite interpret it? It was I landed. I still can never forget January of 1984.

[00:06:43] We talking 40 years ago and it was minus 25. I didn't even have an overcoat when I landed

[00:06:50] and I remember it was pitch dark and all that we saw was two, three feet of white snow. So it was

[00:06:56] a white city and the language was alien and the whole thing looked in a sense unreal. And the

[00:07:04] question was how do you communicate? How do you find your way to the market to do your basic

[00:07:10] personal affairs. But then as I walked into the embassy for the first time and we had a beautiful

[00:07:16] heritage embassy, it was another world where you know you saw people sitting quietly in their chambers

[00:07:23] going about their business immersed in their papers and their analysis and their study

[00:07:29] and the whole thing looked very intimidating. But then you know things began to improve. I mean

[00:07:34] you started moving around traveling around. And if I can fast forward to when I became a mid-level

[00:07:41] diplomat and of course finally as ambassador to Russia which was my last ambassadorial

[00:07:47] assignment. So I was actually it was quite an emotional journey. The began in Moscow and ended

[00:07:52] in Moscow but it was a different country because I began in the... You must have been a different

[00:07:57] diplomat. Yeah I was you know battle hardened. I don't know whether I was wiser but certainly more

[00:08:02] battle hardened, more bruised, more experienced and before that I was high commissioner to Bangladesh.

[00:08:09] I always tell my friends that I walked into my IR lectures as an idealist and I walked out

[00:08:14] as a thorough realist. I can imagine what it must have been for you. Yeah I mean it's completely

[00:08:21] different when you get into the business of diplomatic affairs. You realize that the

[00:08:28] appearances of let's say comfort and luxury and lifestyle are only that much. Underneath all that

[00:08:39] surface lies a very very intense struggle to defend your country's interests

[00:08:49] and to promote your country's interests. And you are pitted against the best in the business.

[00:08:56] So the battlefield is actually that's what I would call it, is flat, is equal because it's one man

[00:09:05] against another man. And it all depends at the end of the day on individual skills.

[00:09:11] And what makes a negotiation successful or a failure and then when you look back

[00:09:18] you do recall that some things which you did really were successful or you were proud of doing.

[00:09:26] And the second thing of course is you graduate in this business because in the initial stages

[00:09:31] you're the backroom boy, you're not in the camera lights, you are doing the real hard work,

[00:09:36] the speedwork. But as you kind of evolve and grow into the career and move up in the ladder,

[00:09:45] then the cameras begin to look at you. And then you have no one to look back at it's you

[00:09:50] and nothing else. So the responsibility of what you say, what you do, how you act,

[00:09:58] how you craft policy, how you report back to your capital, how you implement directions from

[00:10:07] your capital. These all become very, very critical. But briefly I mean the job description

[00:10:15] of the Indian ambassador to Russia and the Indian high commissioner to Bangladesh were like

[00:10:20] the North Pole and South Pole. Bangladesh was a completely different and I spent seven,

[00:10:26] eight years in that country over two periods. It was a completely different set of challenges.

[00:10:32] We can talk about it. And Moscow was a very, very different set. So you also realize

[00:10:39] how your country is positioned in different capitals of the world. In certain capitals you could be

[00:10:47] a dominant player because of various reasons. Whereas in some capitals, you're just one among many.

[00:10:56] But I found that over a period of time as India grew in stature, as an Indian diplomat,

[00:11:02] you definitely had more overall to play. You were counted more. You had a greater visibility

[00:11:13] and therefore the job became even more challenging and interesting.

[00:11:18] That's quite a fascinating description. And thank you for that personal sharing of experience.

[00:11:23] I'm sure for in service, as per your own country will also be benefiting from that point.

[00:11:29] Now allow me to take the conversation to the year when the coal war ended and probably you were

[00:11:36] also young and new to foreign service. Then after the Soviet disintegration, the global

[00:11:42] political landscape sort of changed and so did India's economic and political worldview,

[00:11:48] especially vis-a-vis a United States and Russia. And professionally you started your career

[00:11:55] in the foreign service during the final years of the coal war and have had a ringside view

[00:12:01] to this tectonic shift in the global and South Asia's regional geopolitics.

[00:12:08] Tell us about the deliberations that led to such a shift in India's foreign policy and what it meant

[00:12:14] for Indian diplomat posted not just yourself but across the world.

[00:12:21] Yeah, no thank you. This is a really interesting question and it brings back many memories for me.

[00:12:27] You know in terms of India's deliberations that went on in India and what it meant for Indian

[00:12:33] diplomats, let me take the first part. To be honest, India was a recipient and kind of a

[00:12:43] rule-taker. We were not a rule-shaper. We were not a country which was actually influencing

[00:12:50] these global events. When I joined the foreign service and my generation, for us the most important

[00:12:57] global capital was Moscow because the most important relationship India had was with the Soviet

[00:13:03] Union and we had the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971. That was in some sense a strategic anchor

[00:13:10] for India. So when and this was during the coal war but when the coal war ended,

[00:13:15] it ended abruptly. It ended without a single shortping fired. There was no military conflict.

[00:13:25] It actually ended because of the collapse of the Soviet state, the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev

[00:13:32] as a general secretary. So for us it was a huge setback strategically speaking because the stability

[00:13:41] and the security that we had taken for granted from the Soviet Union had disappeared overnight.

[00:13:48] So it was a strategic setback and we had to go back to the drawing board to find out what do we do

[00:13:56] because that was the period in which our relationship with the United States and the West

[00:14:01] was very strained. Remember we had just gone through 1971 where the United States and India were

[00:14:08] exactly in the opposite sides of the whole situation. The United States had a military alliance

[00:14:14] and extremely close relationship with Pakistan, China was somewhere in the middle.

[00:14:20] So the deliberations in India essentially related to how do we contain the damage

[00:14:28] and what do we do? So that was one aspect. The second aspect was that at the same time,

[00:14:33] and we were talking now 1991, was the year in which the Indian economy collapsed

[00:14:40] and we were forced to mortgage our gold reserves to the IMF because we had run out of foreign exchange.

[00:14:47] We were in the thick of an economic crisis. And again out of compulsion just as in the case of

[00:14:54] the disintegration of the Soviet Union, we had no choice but to embark on a huge economic

[00:15:01] reforms process, basically to dismantle the license range that we inherited from the British.

[00:15:08] So we had two parallel processes going on in internal crisis and an external crisis.

[00:15:14] So the period of the 90s, the whole decade was a very difficult period. And on top of the economic

[00:15:21] crisis, we had a huge political crisis. In India, we had successive governments coming in for 12

[00:15:27] months, 13 months. So there was a lot of political instability. So all this meant that was the time for

[00:15:33] India to regroup at a global level, lie low, just kind of pick up the pieces and try to rebuild India

[00:15:45] both internally and externally. So for diplomats outside, Indian diplomats who were posted

[00:15:50] outside, we were all busy making sense of what was going on. And that was the time when thinking

[00:15:58] began in India that maybe we needed to have another fresh look at our relationship with the West

[00:16:05] because remember that time when we went to the IMF and to the World Bank, etc. These are all

[00:16:11] institutions controlled by the West. So unless and until you did not have a certain

[00:16:16] relationship with the West, you would not get the kind of help that you needed.

[00:16:21] So that I think began that decade of the 90s saw a recalibration or the beginnings of recalibration

[00:16:30] away from the Soviet Union, away from Moscow towards the West.

[00:16:34] Do you have a personal experience of that time that you can share when all this happened and

[00:16:39] this conversation that you were talking about? Can you share some of your personal experience?

[00:16:43] Yeah, of course I was in the Prime Minister's office for five years. So I saw five different

[00:16:51] Prime Ministers come say for periods of 12 months each, coalition governments, you know it all

[00:16:58] to give credit to the Indian bureaucracy and the Indian institutions. They managed to run the country

[00:17:06] despite these frequent changes. I of course was not in Russia that time, I was back in Delhi

[00:17:17] but we you know we went through a very difficult period away with there were political

[00:17:22] assassinations in India. So everyone, each one of us tried to put in our best to make sure that

[00:17:30] we contributed to strengthening the nation. And there was confusion, I mean I remember I was also

[00:17:38] posted in Washington in the early 90s and again that period was a period in which India was going

[00:17:46] through a huge problems in Punjab because of the Kalistan issue in Kashmir and I was assigned to

[00:17:51] the Congressional hill to the Capitol Hill as part of the embassies outreach to the US Senate and

[00:17:59] the Congress. And I remember as a young diplomat walking the corridors trying to convince and meet

[00:18:07] staffers, young staffers and trying to explain to them what was happening in India because in the

[00:18:14] Congress India was facing a very, very difficult time. There was a huge pressure on India on the

[00:18:21] human rights issues, lot of hostility and so my job was to go and explain to the staffers and

[00:18:30] India was not so visible on the US radar at that time. So to explain to them what India is,

[00:18:36] what was Punjab, what was Kashmir, why to explain what was happening, why it was happening,

[00:18:43] the role of Pakistan, we were basically with our backs to the wall. So every day I'd come back

[00:18:48] from the hill to the embassy, report back to the ambassador and you know we used to have these

[00:18:55] almost strategy sessions every day what to do because every day was a new day was a new challenge

[00:19:02] and a new situation where you would get hit or attacked by one congressman or the other

[00:19:09] and we had very few supporters in the Congress who were ready to stand up and speak for India

[00:19:15] so that I that of course I certainly remember. Yeah, I mean the another significant year for India's

[00:19:21] post-Cold War foreign policy is the year 2005 when India signed a historic civil nuclear agreement

[00:19:29] also known as Indonesia's nuclear deal. There was obviously a context to that deal on the American

[00:19:36] side which had entered into what it calls a war on terror after the 9-11 attack.

[00:19:43] But tell us how did India oppose this deal and how did it contribute to New Delhi's

[00:19:49] now strong relationship with Washington you know compared to you know what you just described

[00:19:53] earlier. Yeah, so I think we can continue from where I left off. I talked to you about the turbulent

[00:19:59] times of the early 90s in the India-US relationship and then you entered what was called the Unipolar

[00:20:05] moment. The Soviet Union had disappeared there was only one single global power which was not very

[00:20:12] friendly to India so in the period leading up to 2005 you also had another development you had

[00:20:20] Vladimir Putin take over as the president of Russia in the year 2000 and that was the beginning

[00:20:28] of the rejuvenation of the Russian nation. But by the time we reached 2005 already as I said because

[00:20:37] of the assistance we got for our economic reforms from the West and also remember there was another

[00:20:44] event which took place which was not just 9-11 which was 2001 but in 1998 India went nuclear

[00:20:54] and when India went nuclear the relationship with the United States broke down. We were put under

[00:21:00] sanctions we were literally it was much worse than the early 19s which I described to you

[00:21:07] but the fact is that the Indian government of the day decided with open eyes to go nuclear.

[00:21:14] So we had a situation where we were complete at loggerheads with the western world including

[00:21:20] Japan, Canada, the United States everyone else and this is a remarkable twist of how global events

[00:21:29] can turn around in such a short time so from this moment to 2005 was a dramatic turn and 2005

[00:21:39] and the events leading up till 2008 when the civil nuclear deal was negotiated it took three years

[00:21:45] negotiated that was the foundational transformation of the India-U.S relationship

[00:21:52] so from adversaries, from suspicious partners, uncomfortable partners we actually moved into a

[00:22:00] very different terrain of being strategic partners and the United States the same country which

[00:22:06] at sanctioned us which was pillering us on human rights and everything else actually

[00:22:14] led the world to lift the nuclear apartheid against India despite our nuclear explosions

[00:22:21] enabled us to lift all the sanctions against us, enabled us to get the technology we needed

[00:22:29] and in a sense brought India back into the mainstream of the nuclear system and access to technology.

[00:22:39] Now of course there are many reasons why this happened but it was a leap of faith for both the

[00:22:46] Indian government under Prime Minister Manhansing and successive US President George W. Bush

[00:22:52] and of course before that Bill Clinton had begun the process.

[00:22:56] So this is the whole saga where you literally challenged yourself but you believed

[00:23:06] I mean there were actors out there, Condoleez Arise, a president on this side,

[00:23:11] Manhansing, Nathwa Singh and all these people who actually believed that you could actually do this

[00:23:19] there was a lot of resistance from within the Indian system, from within the American system

[00:23:25] but the only reason why the deal succeeded and happened was because of the push from the White House

[00:23:33] and the PMO in India because the ministries and the bureaucracies were generally opposed

[00:23:40] and were very uncomfortable so this I think marks the turnaround.

[00:23:45] Now despite its growing global standing India's relationship in its own neighbourhood

[00:23:52] remains quite frosty. A major reason for this from where I see it is due to India's

[00:23:59] boundary disputes with its neighbours particularly with China. Do you feel New Delhi's close partnership

[00:24:05] with the Washington especially through Quad has further complicated its relationship with

[00:24:11] Beijing you talked about the Indo-US nuclear deal and you know right up to the Indo-Pacific strategy

[00:24:18] and Quad. I asked this because in September 2014 India rolled out Red Carpet to Chinese

[00:24:27] President Xi Jinping and signed several MOUs that promised to bring in Chinese investments to

[00:24:33] India. What followed in the next few years we are not Chinese MNCs landing in New Delhi

[00:24:39] but the troops of the two countries clashing in Dockland tri-junction and in Galwan Valley.

[00:24:47] How did it come to this?

[00:24:49] Yes so there are many questions and ideas in your questions which I'd like to unpack a little

[00:24:55] bit one by one if you allow. So firstly I would not agree that India's relations with the

[00:25:01] neighbours is frosty I think we made huge progress in terms of the relationships with our neighbours

[00:25:08] particularly in the last 10 years. Today the level of integration that we have in our subcontinent

[00:25:15] is far higher than it has ever been since let us say 1971 or 1965 so there's been massive progress

[00:25:22] you know you are aware of the energy pipelines the highways the civil flights I mean there's a whole

[00:25:28] world out there which is happening and this integration is for real. So yes there are moments

[00:25:36] where we have tensions with our neighbours but that is to be expected because when two sovereign

[00:25:42] nations interact and are close to each other there would be areas and moments of difficulty

[00:25:49] but we have to get over those because in my view we have no choice but to live together

[00:25:56] for now and forever but we believe that the neighbourhood first policy and I myself actually

[00:26:03] was deeply involved in different neighbours of India and we really believe that we have to have

[00:26:10] a good relationship because that is the kind of starting point so that's on the neighbourhood

[00:26:16] and I think we've done well but I do admit there have been moments including with Nepal which

[00:26:20] have created difficulties. We will talk more about Nepal and neighbourhood later but you know

[00:26:26] I'm talking about the border disputes between India and China. So on China you know look this

[00:26:32] thing goes back to the MacMohan line I mean to the Chinese occupation of Tibet because China was

[00:26:40] never India's neighbour then India's neighbour was Tibet it was only when it became the people's

[00:26:45] republic of China when the communist takeover of Beijing and the integration of Tibet that China

[00:26:52] became a neighbour of India and the MacMohan line actually divided British India from Tibet

[00:26:58] so the boundary issue is not so much a dispute over boundary as a dispute or a difference of

[00:27:06] perceptions of where the boundary lies. So we had the war which China in 1962 and after that

[00:27:16] we've had many discussions with them on the alignment of the line of actual control

[00:27:24] and we've had many mechanisms with China on how to address the boundary question.

[00:27:30] 1988 Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi visited and that was the first visit of the Prime Minister

[00:27:35] and the compact wars that we will maintain peace and tranquility on the border for which we

[00:27:41] arrived at several agreements which China and the idea was that till you settle the boundary

[00:27:47] we will maintain peace and tranquility and we will continue with the rest of the relationship political

[00:27:52] relationship economic relationship cultural relationship etc as two normal states.

[00:27:59] And that packed held until the turn of the century I think things began to go south after 2013

[00:28:08] especially after 2014 I mentioned how when Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power

[00:28:15] he rolled out red carpet to Chinese several MOUs were signed and then next couple of years

[00:28:21] you have Dokelam you have Gullwain Valley. Yeah come to that.

[00:28:24] Yeah no but you know I mean look we had a huge issue in 1986 in Sondarong Chhu Valley

[00:28:30] we had a problem in 2013 so it doesn't start from 2014 there were problems with China which predate

[00:28:39] the Modi government the Modi government when it assumed office made all efforts like you have

[00:28:46] mentioned to establish a Modi's vivendi with China. The Prime Minister Modi and his counterparts met

[00:28:54] many many times in Delhi, in China in other capitals to try and so the question I would put it like this

[00:29:03] in my assessment in my opinion China is in many ways responsible for driving India closer to

[00:29:11] the United States. China doesn't view it like this but that is the truth if China were to be able

[00:29:18] as a bigger power, as an aspirant global power be able to conduct a relationship and form a

[00:29:27] relationship with India which is based on accepted principles of international law

[00:29:33] and give respect to India's concerns and to show by its actions not just by words

[00:29:40] that it recognizes India's aspirations as an emerging country in the Indo-Pacific region

[00:29:46] then our relationship would be very different but the Chinese actions have actually been exactly

[00:29:54] the opposite and they have created insecurity in India Delhi in India that has led India's

[00:30:01] that is accelerated India shift towards the United States as I told you India and the United

[00:30:06] States have always historically had very difficult relationships so it was not a natural movement by

[00:30:12] India towards the United States so in 2020 which was the last big kind of standoff

[00:30:21] the Chinese had about 150 or 200,000 troops on the line of actual control we lost 13 soldiers

[00:30:32] that was the biggest and the bloodiest clash on the boundary with China

[00:30:36] that I think was a moment in which China I would say lost India both in terms of public opinion

[00:30:44] and in terms of its foreign policy options so we have to be very clear what was the action

[00:30:50] and what was the reaction the court didn't come before 2020 everything has to be seen in the

[00:30:58] cycle of life the way one action generates another and India has the full right and the

[00:31:10] and the and the it has as a nation it has to protect its interests so it has to find partners

[00:31:18] it has to increase its own national power so I would say that for if you want to look at the

[00:31:25] India China United States triangle it's a complicated triangle a lot of the owners for today's

[00:31:35] situation rest on China China has to return back to the status quo prior to 2020

[00:31:42] it has to adhere to the agreements on peace and tranquility which had violated

[00:31:47] and because of which we've had many rounds of modern negotiations at the official level since

[00:31:53] 2020 so if we if we have a situation where China accepts that they have to return back

[00:32:03] and maintain peace and tranquility and go back to the original arrangements then we can have a

[00:32:09] normal relationship with China well it's a very interesting relationship the political and

[00:32:14] diplomatic side of relationship remains very tensed whereas economically I think the trade between

[00:32:23] India and China keeps on increasing but we'll not talk about that talking about boundary disputes

[00:32:29] boundary disputes I want to talk about how Nepal also has an ongoing boundary disputes with India

[00:32:35] which has also created tensions in the bilateral relationship in the recent years we've had a long

[00:32:42] conversation over it with Ambassador Ranjit Rhe in our podcast back in 2022 so I will not go too

[00:32:48] much into it but let me ask you about India's historical land boundary agreement in 2015 with

[00:32:54] Bangladesh which which ended decades of dispute on the eastern borders you were heavily involved

[00:33:02] in shaping the outcome of that agreement you were in office then you are posted in Bangladesh

[00:33:09] take us through the complex journey of confidence building and negotiations and how two sides

[00:33:15] reach that agreement given the state of affairs between Nepal and India on the boundary disputes

[00:33:22] boundary disputes what lessons could such an agreement hold for Nepal I mean yeah Nuraq this is

[00:33:29] a long story so I'm not going to get into I'll just you know make only a few couple of observations

[00:33:36] number one the success of that land boundary agreement was an outcome of the political will on both sides

[00:33:44] you had an alignment of political leaderships in Dhaka and New Delhi which enabled this to happen

[00:33:50] number two the political leaderships in both capitals or both countries were fully empowered

[00:33:58] they didn't have to look back because in India you had a majority government strong stable government

[00:34:06] similarly in Dhaka you had a strong stable government that was the second thing where you have not

[00:34:12] just the will but you have the capability of addressing difficult issues and number three I think

[00:34:21] there was a enlightened understanding that we were both Bangladesh and India the victims of some other

[00:34:30] people's mistakes we were the outcome of mistakes made by the British and there was no reason for us

[00:34:39] to continue that colonial hangover so the agreement the first agreement again was signed between

[00:34:47] Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujeevan 1974 again at the high point of the India Bangladesh relationship

[00:34:53] and that agreement consisted of three parts I won't go into that but guess what that time you had

[00:35:01] again good leadership strong leaderships yet was that enough it wasn't enough for implementation

[00:35:06] you had the first agreement in 74 and then nothing happened for 30 40 years because of

[00:35:15] the fact that both countries went in different directions and then in 2011 finally you actually

[00:35:22] did a survey you had a protocol which defined how you would solve the issue the basic principle

[00:35:29] there were many issues but the most important was the exchange of enclaves so there were these

[00:35:33] pieces of territory inside Bangladesh cut off from the Indian mainland which were Indian territory

[00:35:40] and you had pieces of territory inside India which were actually Bangladesh's territory but cut off

[00:35:45] from Bangladesh so the agreement was it's one of those most unique agreements in diplomatic history

[00:35:52] where both sides agreed that we will not count the area that you lost again we will not go down

[00:35:59] arithmetic or on a piece of paper calculate the square kilometers we will be more human if we will

[00:36:07] be more statesmen like what we will do is whatever enclaves of India that exist in Bangladesh

[00:36:14] Bangladesh can keep them and the sovereignty of those enclaves will be transferred from India to

[00:36:21] Bangladesh we will count them we will add their areas we will add the populations but we will not

[00:36:30] do some balancing similarly the Bangladeshi enclaves in India which a Bangladeshi territory will be

[00:36:38] absorbed into the Indian Union and become Indian territory and secondly it was even even beyond that

[00:36:47] we will not insist on any transfer of population so the populations who are living in those enclaves

[00:36:52] which are actually Indian inside Bangladesh we said we'll give them a choice you want to come back

[00:36:59] to India you're welcome you but you want to continue in Bangladesh because you've been living

[00:37:03] there for 70 years 80 years you're welcome to be Bangladeshi and similarly on this side and guess what

[00:37:09] when we finally actually exchange the enclaves with the sign of a paper with the with the with that

[00:37:16] agreement on one fine day on the appointed day all the Indian enclaves in Bangladesh became

[00:37:22] Bangladeshi territory all the Bangladeshi enclaves in India became Bung Indian territory all there was

[00:37:28] no transfer of population because the people said we are happy where we are so till yesterday an

[00:37:33] Indian citizen became a Bangladeshi citizen and similarly on the Indian side he was Bangladeshi

[00:37:40] Bikipa came Indian and yes there was some you know loss and gain but the remarkable thing was

[00:37:47] that it happened peacefully I was personally involved in the exchange of people in the weaver worried

[00:37:55] will there be migration are we going to see another replay of 1947 nothing happened nothing so today

[00:38:04] it has been so good for the poorest of the poor because that's what they were small villagers landless

[00:38:11] labor the most deprived voiceless and that was the beauty of this agreement it was a fantastic

[00:38:19] example of how two countries neighboring countries with the most complicated you know a simple thing in

[00:38:25] a border is okay you know you hold my territory I would but what about an enclave which is like 100

[00:38:30] kilometers away from the border and imagine those people who were living in that enclave and there

[00:38:36] were thousand in some enclairs there were thousands of them in some they were maybe 70 80 thousand

[00:38:40] in some there were maybe a few hundred though these people were stateless so I think it was a great

[00:38:47] example and it happened as I said because of the domestic situations and the alignment of stars

[00:38:54] and Manman Singh's government tried to do it I was part of that effort also it failed

[00:39:01] it was the Modi government which succeeded because he came in he came into office in 2014

[00:39:06] he did it in 2015 in one year and this was supposed to be a right wing anti-Muslim kind of government

[00:39:14] this that but he understood the strategic importance and the political importance and after doing

[00:39:21] it he visited Bangladesh I was there as Prime Minister of India and went to say hugely successful

[00:39:27] visit he was greeted with open arms it was a celebration and people looked at him and said you have

[00:39:34] solved what could not be solved since 1947 it's quite a fascinating description and most importantly

[00:39:43] it resolved decades of dispute between the two countries and now let's move the conversation from

[00:39:50] India's challenges to India's achievements despite difficulties in the neighborhood India's global

[00:39:56] outreach in the last decade has increased significantly what has been the hallmark of Indian foreign

[00:40:03] policy pursued in the last decade especially vis-à-vis US Russia and West in general yeah I think

[00:40:13] hallmark if you were to ask me of the policy has been to be more ambitious to be more risk-taking

[00:40:23] and to have a vision for the future so whether you look at our relationship with the United States

[00:40:32] or with Russia or in the early days even with China or with other countries we significantly

[00:40:40] accelerated the pace and the content of each of these relationships we shed the inhibitions

[00:40:50] or the hesitations that were marking our policies in the past so we decided and we chose to see

[00:41:00] what is it that India needed from each of these partners and once you have arrived at that kind of

[00:41:07] assessment or a determination then the view was go for it because time is not on your side

[00:41:15] because if you want to transform the country you have to have these kind of very very intense

[00:41:22] relationships so as I we just discussed the US relationship a little bit on the Russia relationship

[00:41:30] the Russia relationship under Putin from 2014 also proceeded at a fair pace we again there were frequent

[00:41:39] meetings annual summits between Prime Minister Modi and President Putin there was healthy interaction

[00:41:46] in all areas including military etc similarly with Europe we move forward significantly

[00:41:54] but a lot of this was possible because as I said again of the political stability inside India

[00:42:03] and the very authoritative and kind of stable leadership provided by the Prime Minister himself

[00:42:11] I mean remember this was someone who had been denied a US visa when he took office

[00:42:17] so you had a situation where the Indian Prime Minister actually had been denied a visa to enter

[00:42:23] the United States and so the first visit overseas that he made was to the United States so all

[00:42:30] things have happened we have seen a lot of things happen unimaginable so this was the hallmark I would

[00:42:37] say where national interest dominated personal interest and there was this belief that India can

[00:42:45] and must also contribute to international institutions to international global issues on climate change

[00:42:54] for example India was always considered a naysayer that an obstructionist someone who would always say no

[00:43:01] but in the last 10 years we have shifted from being a naysayer to being a solution provider

[00:43:07] on climate and on global warming and we have let the way in terms of green transition

[00:43:13] in terms of renewable energies etc so there is a there is a big fundamental shift

[00:43:19] similarly on the civilizational personality of India there is a greater confidence self-confidence

[00:43:27] that India has something to put on the table and we will put it there is also when it comes to

[00:43:34] say challenges security challenges that we pose that we face an equal candor that you know India

[00:43:42] will defend its security interests from wherever they are threatened so I would say all in all

[00:43:50] this was the way in which foreign policy has been conducted and obviously it's been successful

[00:43:55] and therefore you know there is a feeling in New Delhi that whatever you've done has actually worked

[00:44:03] for India. I'm also looking at how India has interestingly sort of balanced between its relationship

[00:44:11] with the United States and Russia at a time when there is a kind of you know proxy war between

[00:44:17] the West and the Russia especially due to ongoing Ukraine war so you know how would you look

[00:44:23] at India's position in this very complicated landscape. Yeah it was difficult I mean to be honest

[00:44:29] because it remains challenging. It remains challenging and it tested India's diplomatic skills,

[00:44:34] it tested India's political leadership because we had friendships and good relations with both sides

[00:44:42] with Russia, with the United States, with Europe. We were friends with all of them

[00:44:47] and there's huge stakes involved in each of these friendships so the question was what does India do

[00:44:54] and I think what India chose to do was to avoid getting sucked into this proxy war through its

[00:45:02] diplomatic statements and other things and we advocated a return to negotiation and diplomacy

[00:45:09] because the memories of the Cold War still remain but at that time we were much less powerful,

[00:45:15] we were more vulnerable. This time around after 60 years we are most self-confidence so we said listen

[00:45:25] you have to solve this peacefully on the negotiating table not in the battlefield. We did not condemn

[00:45:32] any party, we did not condemn Russia. The Prime Minister announced publicly this is not an error of war

[00:45:40] and we have maintained channels with all sides of this conflict in terms of high level contacts

[00:45:49] in terms of hearing the concerns from both sides and we believe this is the optimal path for India.

[00:45:59] Of course it comes with a price. There were people on the western side in the United States and Europe

[00:46:06] who were not happy with the Indian position and there were similarly people on the Russian side

[00:46:11] who felt India should be more supportive of Russia but this is a conscious decision taken and I

[00:46:17] think it is a continuum of the larger strategic perspective that India kind of brings to bear

[00:46:28] global issues and on the international system.

[00:46:33] Now one of the major agenda India has been raising at the global summits and gathering of

[00:46:39] world leaders in the recent years has been the issue of exclusion of global south in the

[00:46:46] United Nations Security Council. In 2006 it joined Russia, China and Brazil with South Africa

[00:46:54] joined later in 2010 to create bricks and challenge the established power of the west,

[00:47:02] the G7 in shaping global agendas. How significant has bricks been to further India's own ambitions

[00:47:10] to take the global center stage? Yeah so again I mean on the Security Council and bricks I think

[00:47:16] these are two separate issues. On the Security Council India's views are very well known. They've

[00:47:22] been repeated multiple times in multiple forums. We believe that the current Security Council

[00:47:29] is an agronistic, it is a creature of something that happened after 1945 as a foreign minister

[00:47:40] Dr. Jessica Roten has recent book Why Bharat Matters. This is a classic example of freezing the moment.

[00:47:47] You took a moment in the march of human history and you decided that these five will be

[00:47:56] anointed as the permanent members of a small body which is mandated to preserve international

[00:48:02] peace and security. Clearly that body has failed to discharge any worthwhile function

[00:48:09] and secondly it represents nobody. It does not represent the vast majority of mankind

[00:48:17] and India as the most populous country in the world and a growing economy has to have a place

[00:48:24] in such a forum which represents the United Nations mandate and charter to govern international

[00:48:33] peace and security. So that position remains. Now the question is it has not happened yet

[00:48:39] India's membership of the Security Council and people in India are very realistic, they don't

[00:48:44] expect it to happen in the near future but the point is that does not take away from the Indian

[00:48:51] position that the Security Council is defunct. It has not been successful recently in Ukraine

[00:48:58] nor in Gaza. It has not been successful in any venture at all. Now on the BRICS issue

[00:49:06] this is very much part of India's own image of itself that it is not a it is not a lucky of the

[00:49:14] West. It is an old civilization 5,000 years old. It brings its own characteristics to bear

[00:49:22] and its own mindset and its own perspectives on the global order. And Russia, China, South Africa

[00:49:32] are all big powers in their own regions. So the BRICS grouping was actually initially set up

[00:49:40] when it began with an economic agenda largely not a political agenda and in BRICS

[00:49:46] while Russia and China were permanent members and China of course opposes any expansion

[00:49:51] and blocks India's membership. Both South Africa and India were demanders, I mean both of us said

[00:49:59] including Brazil for example that you know it is high time that you listen to the rest of the world

[00:50:06] and they have to have a seat inside and a representation. And this issue came up most recently

[00:50:13] in the context of what India called the global south. The global south is a metaphor for those countries

[00:50:21] who developing and somewhat dispossessed from the international system. So Brazil, South Africa,

[00:50:29] India were on one side who want change whereas Russia and China are on the other side inside

[00:50:37] the Security Council. So I think India is interacting with the BRICS membership and the grouping.

[00:50:44] We participate, we try to make use of the grouping in ways that can help India, let's say for example

[00:50:53] in the new development bank India is one of the largest beneficiaries of their loans and grants.

[00:50:59] We also then can talk freely about the deficiencies of the current global order which was actually a

[00:51:07] western lead and a western created order. So we are able to talk about all these things.

[00:51:12] So the Indian footprint if I can use that word on global issues has expanded because of BRICS

[00:51:22] and BRICS has led and enabled India to talk about different issues without fear of favor.

[00:51:32] Now continuing on the conversation about the global south leadership, India also hosted the 2023

[00:51:39] G20 summit in New Delhi with an ambition of what Indian external affairs minister

[00:51:46] as Jaisankar has framed as preparing India for the world and preparing the world for India.

[00:51:52] Where do you think India is headed after the G20 summit especially in terms of its own foreign

[00:51:57] policy priorities on economy and security? Yeah so I think the G20 of 2023 was held under very

[00:52:07] very difficult circumstances because of the Ukraine conflict and the world was divided down the middle

[00:52:13] between the west and the rest, between the G7 and the G20 and the political standoff

[00:52:20] between Russia and the west was the worst it has ever been since the end of the Cold War

[00:52:26] or it was it was worst it has been since the Cold War. So the split vertical split in the globe

[00:52:35] was visible during the entire year of 2023 when India was chairing the G20. So it was a very

[00:52:44] very challenging moment for Indian diplomacy because you had two three choices either

[00:52:51] you to promote the G20 as a grouping of countries which was responsible for global economic and trade

[00:53:00] and financial issues. So if you failed the G20 would simply kind of break up or become a toothless

[00:53:09] body or it would become a victim of these political divisions that was a real danger. So Indian

[00:53:17] diplomacy led by the prime minister exerted every sinew in its muscle to ensure that it brought all

[00:53:26] these two sides together and finally it did succeed. It had a communique, it had a consensus document

[00:53:34] and finally the G20 came up with an agenda for the future. So this is given a lot of confidence

[00:53:41] to India because if India could manage this it means that the west allowed this to happen

[00:53:51] and it also means that Russia and China also allowed this to happen. So in a sense you can argue

[00:53:58] that all of them actually gave India the success because if one of these parties had decided

[00:54:05] to play the spoiler the India would not have been able to show the success it did. So it is interesting

[00:54:14] how each of these powers and parts of the multi polar system enabled India to show this success.

[00:54:22] So that confidence which India has got again has given it the feeling that what it is doing is right

[00:54:31] you know nothing succeeds like success. So today what India, the second thing which India brought to

[00:54:37] the G20 when you talk about the future and the lessons is that India was able to put things on

[00:54:44] the table which it could not do in the past. And what was that? That was to exhibit and showcase

[00:54:54] its own successes in its own economic and domestic transformation, things like digital economy,

[00:55:00] digital public infrastructure, green transition and many many other approaches that India has

[00:55:06] successfully implemented within India. It also was able to talk about the global south and reflect

[00:55:14] the global south's positions on so many issues. So I think for the future in a post 2023 G20 situation

[00:55:23] you will find India being more active, more visible on global issues in each of these relationships

[00:55:31] and leveraging its successes at home to contribute to global good and global stability.

[00:55:41] We've had a fascinating conversation so far with regards to India's foreign policy pursuit

[00:55:47] over the past decade and its future ambitions. What does India's increased global standing mean

[00:55:53] for South Asia region especially with regards to its neighborhood for first policy?

[00:55:58] Yeah, that's a great question. I mean look it is a given that for any country to be able to pursue

[00:56:08] its global emissions it actually has to have good relations with its neighbors and what I can say

[00:56:17] is that if India grows fast in a balanced manner in an atmosphere of stability within a democratic

[00:56:28] framework all this will contribute and will contribute to making a better neighborhood.

[00:56:38] It will open opportunities for the smaller neighbors to benefit from and to participate in this

[00:56:46] growth story. If I put it another way round if you had a situation where India was not growing

[00:56:54] was rife with internal disturbances, was unstable or was a stagnant economy faced with

[00:57:02] myriad problems we would all have suffered. So it is in the interest of the region

[00:57:08] that there is a growth pole that there is an anchor of stability in the region.

[00:57:14] So I am convinced that an India which grows in a healthy fashion, in a sustainable fashion

[00:57:23] and in an inclusive fashion can actually lift to use a Chinese metaphor all the smaller

[00:57:32] boats around it in the ocean. That's what the Chinese say about their neighbors and I think

[00:57:38] it applies equally to India's neighbors that when the waves are rising the small boats can also rise

[00:57:44] along with the wave and that's the way we see it. The fundamental approach of the neighborhood first

[00:57:52] policy is prosper thy neighbor not beggar thy neighbor and to respect sovereignty's interests

[00:58:02] allow neighbors the space they need to pursue their national interests as they see fit

[00:58:09] and collectively grow and find the mechanisms, the creativities. I would say for example our

[00:58:16] relations with Bangladesh today and for the last 10 years or more the kind of things that have

[00:58:22] happened would have been unthinkable 15 years ago. There is literally a revolution underway

[00:58:29] in the kind of connectivities and projects and things that Indian-Mangalites have been able to do.

[00:58:35] So there are good examples but I would also admit there are bad examples

[00:58:42] but on the whole I would say if India succeeds on the global stage as an emerging force for global

[00:58:51] good that will definitely have positive externalities within the region.

[00:58:59] Now despite what you just claimed globally we are also witnessing smaller states struggling to

[00:59:04] manage competing ambitions between big powers including the United States and China.

[00:59:09] Now in South Asia we are already seeing this translate into domestic power political polarization.

[00:59:16] In countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka we have seen that over MCC and recently also in Maldiivs.

[00:59:24] As a resident power on the rise what could India do to ensure such a competition does not have a

[00:59:31] spillover effect to destabilize the region or is India's preoccupation with its own interest vis-a-vis

[00:59:38] Indo-Pacific and Quad or its differences against China and Pakistan too important to be distracted

[00:59:45] about what is happening in small neighboring states.

[00:59:48] No not at all I mean this whole Indo-Pacific Quad etc is happening at a different level.

[00:59:54] I mean that has got nothing to do with how India is approaching the neighborhood.

[00:59:59] I mean the whole of South Asia is very much part of the Indo-Pacific region so that I think

[01:00:05] has nothing to do with how India's yes India definitely would not like power play and contestation

[01:00:12] to disrupt the normal flow of relationships in this region.

[01:00:19] We do not want disruptive forces or disruptive policies here.

[01:00:24] We respect small states, we respect their choices and we respect their autonomy.

[01:00:31] After all all these are three things which India itself has canvassed loudly on the global stage.

[01:00:38] So when it comes to the smaller nations in the South Asian region absolutely we stand by all

[01:00:43] these principles. Therefore it is important for major powers whether it's the United States or China

[01:00:50] or anyone else to respect and give the same respect to these same principles which India has prepared

[01:00:57] to give and what India is saying is that we don't live in a vacuum, we live in a real world and

[01:01:04] that real world means real geography, real history, real civilizational connect, real cultural bonds.

[01:01:14] Any activity or power or force which seeks to disrupt and rupture any of these attributes

[01:01:26] which we have inherited over the last thousands of years is going to create more problems than do

[01:01:33] any good and we have every right therefore to question the motives and the intent behind such activities.

[01:01:41] We do not want any adversarial or inimical power to come to the region to create disruptions

[01:01:48] but at the same time we respect the decisions of these small nations and we will not force

[01:01:55] any of them to make choices which are unviable or unrealistic.

[01:02:00] Whether you are Nepal or your India or your Bhutan we have to remember that every nation

[01:02:08] till as long as we agree that the nation state is a peace on the geostrategic is an entity

[01:02:18] recognized by law international law has the right and has security concerns and has the right

[01:02:26] to protect those security concerns. So it doesn't mean that large states do not have security concerns

[01:02:34] or interests and if you have to live together it is important that all of us big and small

[01:02:42] live in this compact where we respect each other's concerns and we promote each other's happiness

[01:02:51] and stability. I would have loved to pick your brain on some of these issues but I am afraid we've

[01:02:57] run out of our allotted studio time thank you for this open and candidate conversation Ambassador

[01:03:02] Saran. Thank you so much Anurag, pleasure to be with you thank you so much.

[01:03:08] Thanks for listening to Pots by PEI I hope you enjoyed Anurag's conversation with Pankasharan

[01:03:14] on navigating India's diplomatic landscape and inside of you. Today's episode was produced

[01:03:19] by Nyejandri with support of Kushi Hang with a subcota and me Pragerikaikhi. The episode was

[01:03:24] recorded at PEI studio and was edited by with a subcota. Our theme music is courtesy of Rohit Shakir

[01:03:31] from Zindabad. If you liked today's episode please subscribe to our podcast also please do us

[01:03:36] a favor by sharing us on social media and leave a review on Spotify, Apple Podcast, Google

[01:03:41] Podcast or wherever you listen to the show. For PEI's video related content please search for policy

[01:03:46] entrepreneurs on YouTube to catch the latest from us on Nepal's policy and politics. Peace follow us

[01:03:52] on Twitter at tweet to PEI that's tweet followed by the number two and PEI and on Facebook at policy

[01:03:59] entrepreneurs ink you can also visit PI dot center to learn more about us thanks once again

[01:04:05] from me Pragerikaikhi and we will see you soon in our next episode.