Conversations: Ambassador Ranjit Rae on How to Reset India-Nepal Ties - Part Two

[00:00:04] - [Speaker 0]
Namaste and welcome to Pods by PEE, a policy discussion series brought to you by Policy Entrepreneurs Inc. My name is Kushi Hang. In today's episode, which is the second part of a two part series, we have Anurag Acharya, director of practice at PEI in conversation with ambassador Ranjit Re. Ambassador Re is a retired Indian diplomat. During his tenure of over thirty years in the Indian Foreign Service, he held various positions including the ambassador of India to Vietnam and Hungary, the first secretary of the permanent mission of India to the United Nations in New York, and the head of the Northern Division in the Ministry of External Affairs dealing with Nepal and Bhutan.

[00:00:45] - [Speaker 0]
From 2013 to 2017, Ambassador Ray served as the Indian ambassador to Nepal. During these years, Nepal witnessed some historic events including the promulgation of a new constitution and the earthquake of twenty fifteen. This was also a tumultuous period in the Nepal India relationship about which Ambassador Ray has discussed extensively in his recent book, Resetting India Nepal Ties. Continuing from last week's conversation, in today's episode, Anurag gets Ambassador Ray to share details about his engagement with Nepal and its messy politics, from his ringside view of the 12 agreement signed between Nepal's political parties and the CPM malwist to the challenging period in the office as an Indian ambassador to Nepal. They end the conversation by discussing Ambassador Ri's proposition on how the two countries can overcome the historic and recent tensions suspicion to reset bilateral ties that are grounded on new geopolitical realities.

[00:01:44] - [Speaker 0]
We hope you enjoy the conversation.

[00:01:48] - [Speaker 1]
Namaste. This is Anuragacharya.

[00:01:50] - [Speaker 2]
Namaste. This is Ranjit Re.

[00:01:52] - [Speaker 1]
And I welcome you back to the conversation where we are examining Nepal's relationship with India. Ambassador Re, we understand your first engagement with Nepali politics and its, actors was back in 02/1956 when the 12 agreement was being inked in New Delhi. That was a time when you were heading the North division looking at Nepal and Bhutan. You mentioned some intricate details about this, in your book, Katpandu Dilemma, resetting Nepal, in India Nepal ties on how different institutions within India were divided to an extent that there were parallel conversations happening with then King Gyanendra and the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists. Can you elaborate more on this?

[00:02:37] - [Speaker 2]
So I joined our Northern Division in the year 02/2002, and that is when the Maoist insurgency was at its peak. And you would recall the DG of the armed police force was also assassinated, I think, in 02/2003. And, you know, 02/2001, the nine eleven terrorist incidents had happened in The United States. And in India, we had our own Naxal problem, you know, the extreme left organization, which in our assessment had really degenerated into a very violent terrorist organization. So the prevailing opinion at that point in time was that the Maoists should really be crushed and I think that's what King Gyanendra was trying to do.

[00:03:24] - [Speaker 2]
And our approach was very clear from the time of Prime Minister Vajpayee, he was the Prime Minister when I had joined, to prime minister Manmohan Singh. India's mantra for Nepal was the twin pillar mantra, which was constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy, and that it's the Maoists, the insurgents that are evil, and they must be degraded and destroyed by the Royal Nepalese Army at the time. And so we had supported the Royal Nepalese Army very strongly. We had set up a bilateral working group to provide arms, ammunition, and equipment. And that was the prevailing theory.

[00:04:09] - [Speaker 2]
That was the prevailing thinking in India. Of course, over a period of time between 2002 and 02/2005, things changed politically in Nepal. And gradually, you had a situation of appointed prime ministers till ultimately king Gyanendra took over complete executive power and that India was very dismayed at. And our sense was that for there to be stability in Nepal, it is very important for the monarchy and the political parties to work together. That this was a balance that had emerged after 1990.

[00:04:50] - [Speaker 2]
And this balance should be maintained. It cannot be rolled back. And I think it's only after king Gyanendra's, you know, takeover of executive power that things changed. And the other two sides, the other two actors in this whole process, the Maoists and the political parties got together. The Indian establishment was very divided even then because there were voices which said that, look, it's more important to ensure that the Maoists are decimated.

[00:05:27] - [Speaker 2]
If the king has taken over executive power, doesn't matter because he's going to destroy the Maoists, and that's a good thing. And, you know, democracy will happen later. But I think at that point in time, our assessment was that there was a military stalemate that the Royal Nepalese Army could not crush the Maoists and the Maoists could not move from their rural areas to the urban areas. So there was a military stalemate. And the sense was that there is no option but a political solution.

[00:06:00] - [Speaker 2]
And so after the king's takeover of February 2005, the dynamics changed and the Maoists and the parties got together. And this was really Nepalese process owned and driven by Nepalese. It happened on Indian soil, and it was supported by us, but it was really a a Nepalese process.

[00:06:21] - [Speaker 1]
It's interesting that you mentioned that because there are a lot of speculations about that time. Some would argue that Maoist reaching out to the Indian establishment certainly helped or persuaded India in rethinking its twin pillar policy. And some other would also argue that India was vengeful of Gyanendrasa seeking Chinese support to quell Maoist movement. How would you respond to that?

[00:06:46] - [Speaker 2]
So obviously, we would be unhappy if the king was seeking Chinese support and especially military support. But that, as you said, is one of the flexible issues in our first episode we discussed. But I think our strategic view was that there is a balance between the monarchy and the political parties and that must be maintained. And it's only if these two forces work together that the Maoist insurgency will get resolved. Unfortunately, that didn't happen.

[00:07:15] - [Speaker 2]
And and and that is the reason why the other two forces got together. I think the Maoists also realized that there was no way that they could militarily take over. And the Maoists had made an outreach to the government of India during Prime Minister Vajpayee's time, but we had not responded to them at all. We responded to them only after the King's takeover of February 2005 when the first preliminary contacts at official level were made with the Maoist leadership you know, initially Baburam Bhattaraji and then subsequently Prachand. So you you have to see the evolution of India's position over a period of time and in sequence.

[00:08:02] - [Speaker 1]
Of course, there was also a contradiction between India's own domestic policy regarding the Maoist and then its Nepal policy regarding their Nepali comrades. While Manmohan Singh government saw the Indian Maoist as the single most threat within the country, why was it willing to engage with the Nepali Maoist?

[00:08:22] - [Speaker 2]
Well, certainly, the prime minister Manmohan Singh had termed the Indian Naxals as the biggest threat to our country. And, you know, we had followed this greyhounds model in Andhra Pradesh which is very successful in neutralizing the the Indian Naxalites. And, those were also the days of this red corridor going all the way from Nepal to India, and there was a fear that if the Maoists take over in Nepal, it will become a safe haven for Indian Naxals. And hence, it was in India's interest that the Nepalese Maoists are also destroyed. But we realized over a period of time that there was a military stalemate and that there was no way that the Nepalese Maoists would be destroyed militarily by the Royal Nepalese Army.

[00:09:15] - [Speaker 2]
So, in such a situation, what option do you have? So, the only option is then to tentatively see, and I think this is what the political parties did, is to engage with the Maoists. Of course, even the king was talking to the Maoists as were Nepali Congress and the UML and try to see if some modus vivendi, if some possible solution can be worked out. Obviously, if no solution was worked out then the insurgency would have continued, many more people would have lost their lives. I mean 17,000 people lost their lives during the ten year insurgency.

[00:09:51] - [Speaker 2]
So if there was no settlement, can you imagine how many more innocent lives would be lost?

[00:09:57] - [Speaker 1]
Well, in 02/2013, of course, you landed in Kathmandu as an Indian ambassador. Just when things were heating up on the constitutional front, the first CA had been dissolved. The Maoists were out of power, and the date for the second CA elections were scheduled. The outgoing ambassador Jayant Prasad and, you know, Rakesh Sood before him were already being criticized for their visible role, especially with regard to support for the agitating Madhisi parties. What was going through your mind when you arrived here as an ambassador of a country that shares an open border with Nepal, has, some legitimate security concerns?

[00:10:37] - [Speaker 1]
But how would you define India's stake in the political process then that was essentially Nepal's internal process?

[00:10:45] - [Speaker 2]
So at a fundamental level, it is in India's interest that there is peace and stability in Nepal. If there is insecurity and instability in Nepal, given our open borders, we feel this will also spill over into India. And we have already seen in the past when Nepalese territory has been used for purposes that have been inimical to Indian security or to Indian interests. So I think a fundamental objective of our policy was to see that there is a stable and secure Nepal. That's in our interest.

[00:11:21] - [Speaker 2]
It's in Nepal's interest too. And hence India very strongly supported the constituent assembly elections, the second constituent assembly elections, we provided a lot of assistance and support to the Nepalese authorities. In fact, I remember, you know, very soon after I came here, had a meeting with editors of National Dailies of Nepal. I think it was a week before the elections. And you can't imagine how skeptical they were.

[00:11:50] - [Speaker 2]
Many of those very senior journalists wondered whether the Maoists would participate in the elections or not or whether the elections would even be held just one week before the elections. So I think India and the entire international community felt it's absolutely essential that the elections are held, that a constitution is drafted because that is the path to peace, security and stability in Nepal. At a personal level, for me, Nepal has been my dream job. And so this is something I had always wanted because I find it to be a fascinating country. So I was very excited to come to Nepal at such a challenging time.

[00:12:33] - [Speaker 1]
In your book, you also mention about your close and frank relationship with some of the senior political figures in Nepal. We're probably more appreciative of Indian concerns regarding the constitution drafting. But then this was also seen as open meddling by Nepali media or sections of Nepal's civil society. When you look back, do you think that there is a need to reconsider this approach or the way the Indian diplomatic mission engages in Nepal with various constituencies?

[00:13:06] - [Speaker 2]
So, you know, the so called Indian meddling, you have to see it in context. India in some way or the other was associated with the peace process and the agreement of November 2005 between the political parties and the Maoists. So that was a fundamental agreement. Again, after the Madhesi agitations of 02/2008, India was in one way or the other associated with bringing about some understanding between the government of Prime Minister Koirala and the Madhesi leaders. So the expectation was that the interim constitution had accommodated the key elements of the peace process or of the 2006 agreement as well as the Madhesi you know, the agreements that led to the end of the Madhesi uprisings of two thousand seven, two thousand eight.

[00:14:01] - [Speaker 2]
So India had been associated with these. So the expectation was that when the new constitution would be adopted, these key elements of the agreements which had led to the stage of the constitution being drafted would be incorporated into the new constitution And that perhaps in the views of some people, especially some of the Maoists and the Madhesis, didn't happen. So when that didn't happen, obviously there was agitation. And that didn't happen because the composition of the constituent assembly changed. In the first constituent assembly, the Maoists and the Madi were pretty dominant.

[00:14:40] - [Speaker 2]
In the second constituent assembly, they did very poorly. So some of the issues which had been agreed earlier upon were no longer the basis for understanding. And there was also a feeling that the two larger parties would now go and adopt the constitution as they choose because they have the requisite majorities. So this was the context. So where India was coming from, we were saying that, look, your objective is to have peace and stability in your society.

[00:15:15] - [Speaker 2]
That is also India's objective for reasons I've already mentioned earlier. Now you are a very diverse society. You have different communities, different groups of people, different languages, different religions, aspirations of different groups. There is a historical context where some groups feel deprived or marginalized. They want a greater say in sharing political and economic resources and power.

[00:15:41] - [Speaker 2]
So particularly in the context of the Maoist insurgency and the Madhesi uprisings. So if you have to have peace and stability in the future, doesn't it make sense to try and take everyone along to the extent possible? And you've already signed solemn agreements with various groups. So doesn't it make sense to accommodate everybody, carry everybody along? So this was the only message that India constantly gave from the highest political levels to the level of the ambassador that please take everyone along.

[00:16:19] - [Speaker 2]
Because if you don't take people along, you may not have stability in the country. That was the time, you remember, there was a secessionist movement in the Tarai led by C. K. Raoud. Before that, there had been these armed vigilante groups in the Tarai.

[00:16:35] - [Speaker 2]
There was also the extreme left wing group of the Maoist, the splinter group that believed in violence. So the idea was that please accommodate the aspirations of the diverse communities as you've already agreed in the various agreements and take them along.

[00:16:52] - [Speaker 1]
Well, what I was referring to is because what you say is all true and you could have best interests at your heart. What I was referring to and asking about is the approach that the Indian mission in Kathmandu chose to take. You look at other missions during that time, they were quite vocal in their public outreach, in their public discourse, participating across various sectors and stakeholder group trying to communicate what they would like to ideally see Nepal constitution to be. Whereas Indian diplomatic mission primarily chose to engage at the higher political level. Do you think there is a need to reconsider that approach when it when India engages in Nepal in future?

[00:17:36] - [Speaker 2]
Perhaps. Because you're right. I mean, I think we tended to follow a more top down approach of dealing with the political leadership because they really had the authority. And as you know, most of the contentious issues were resolved by people, a few leaders sitting at that Gokarna resort, five or six leaders meeting over a period of days to resolve these disputes. So I think they were really the key decision makers.

[00:18:02] - [Speaker 2]
I think civil society was important, but I don't know how influential they were in terms of some of the contentious issues of the constitution. So I agree with you that in the future we must be equally engaged with civil society actors and especially the youth and not just limit ourselves to political parties and certainly not just to the top leaders of political parties.

[00:18:30] - [Speaker 1]
I I say this because I I clearly remember the time when the final days of the constitution drafting and the draft was being finalized and and India openly expressed some of its concerns regarding the provisions, especially, you know, those that were also raised by the Madhisis. And then, of course, then external affairs minister of India, Jaya Shankar, had arrived as a special envoy. And then that created quite an uproar, not just in Nepali media and civil society, but also among senior party members of Nepal's major political parties. When you look back on that, do you think that perhaps things could have been handled in a better way? Or would it have been better if it had not taken so much of strain on the bilateral ties?

[00:19:16] - [Speaker 2]
So I don't think India was intrusive in terms of saying how many provinces or how much quotas and so on. That's incorrect. What actually happened was there was a story in the Indian Express which broke saying that India wants one, two, three, four, five, six, seven and that was identical to what the Madhesi demands were. And that story itself was incorrect. And our spokesman in India did say that this is not India's ask, this is what the Madhesis have asked for.

[00:19:44] - [Speaker 1]
You mentioned about the white paper that was circulated.

[00:19:48] - [Speaker 2]
Yes. And so that was completely wrong. So what India had been saying is accommodate the concerns of everyone. India wasn't saying you have five, six, seven, eight provinces or you have 20% reservations. India was simply saying that since we were associated with your solemn agreements of 2005 and subsequently the Mazesi agreements, please accommodate these concerns of the others and take them along.

[00:20:14] - [Speaker 2]
If you don't accommodate the concerns, you'll have problems and you could see problems already emerging even before the constitution was adopted. Secondly, on the visit of the foreign secretary Jaishankar who is now our foreign minister, I think that was misunderstood by the political leadership. In Nepal, it was projected as something very arrogant and somebody coming to dictate to the Nepalese etc, which was not the case at all. I think the only message that our foreign secretary was trying to convey is that there is still time to accommodate those that are unhappy with the constitution. And the second message of course was saying, Yes, you can adopt your constitution and you can have widespread recognition of the constitution.

[00:21:01] - [Speaker 2]
But it's important for Nepal, given that India is a very important neighbour for Nepal that India's support for the constitution would also be desirable for Nepal. So I think a lot was made of this thing and I think there was a fear in the minds of some of the political leaders here that perhaps the second constituent assembly may go the way of the first. A lot of rumor mongering happened at that time that India does not want this constitution etc. So you know which happens from time to time. Whether we would do things differently, I think we should always be open to an introspection and to see what we did, where we went wrong, what could we have done better.

[00:21:47] - [Speaker 2]
I think any mature diplomacy or foreign service, you know, would do that. Were we too involved in this whole process? Process? Was it too intrusive? I guess history will judge.

[00:22:03] - [Speaker 2]
But as I said, you have to see it in a certain context. I had leaders from some of the Madhisi parties telling me that, Look, you were the guarantors of this agreement on the Madhesis. And now look what's happened, we haven't got anything. So how do we trust you? What value do you have?

[00:22:25] - [Speaker 2]
So you have to see take that also into context. So it was all these factors that influenced Indian thinking, India's role in this whole process.

[00:22:37] - [Speaker 1]
You, of course, remained in Kathmandu until 2017 when things gradually began to improve between the two countries, at least, you know, at the higher political level. Can you share some of the details about how both sides got over those difficult period in the bilateral relations and and what were the takeover lessons at least for the Indian side?

[00:22:59] - [Speaker 2]
Well, first of all, as I said, Nepal is a very important country for India. So India must have a very good working relationship with the government of the day. Now after the constitution was adopted, you had elections and the UML government came in with a thumping majority. And so you see that India sent its foreign minister even before the leader of the UML was elected head of the parliamentary party. The Indian foreign minister visited Nepal to reach out to the new leadership.

[00:23:33] - [Speaker 2]
So I think it's very important for both countries to have a good working relationship at the political level because of our security interest, because of our development cooperations, many factors in this relationship. And I think this will always be the case. You may have differences, you may not agree on everything, but it's very important to keep engaged with each other, keep talking to each other. So I think this is what we did and I think gradually things improved. Of course, you will recall again twenty nineteen, twenty twenty things dipped very significantly but again there was a rapprochement.

[00:24:13] - [Speaker 2]
So in any close relationship, I would even say intimate relationship as between India and Nepal, there are ups and downs in the relationship. And in Nepal, there is always this anti India sentiment which is useful politically for leaders. So there is always this aspect, but I think the effort on both sides really is to get over these temporary hiccups and focus on our strategic path.

[00:24:49] - [Speaker 0]
You have been listening to Pods by PEI. I am Kushi Han. This is a quick reminder to all of you to do us a favor by sharing us on social media and leaving a review on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, or wherever you listen to the show. Now let's get back to the conversation between Anurag and Ambassador Ray.

[00:25:13] - [Speaker 1]
Lately, there has been a lot of talk about resetting the bilateral ties between, Nepal and India. You also mentioned that earlier, and also you've argued about that in your book. But then that requires getting over the underlying tensions, addressing them, how they have strained the bilateral relationships. One of the long standing irritant between the two countries have been claim over disputed territories, you know, especially in the western part. While Nepal's recent claim to Lipu Lake and Limpiadhura has been a unilateral one, against which you've also made some elaborate arguments in your book.

[00:25:51] - [Speaker 1]
The dispute over other territories like Kalapani and Susta have been formally documented by the 1981 Nepal India Joint Technical Committee, Border Joint Technical Committee. In 2014, the issue was also reverted to foreign secretary levels, for final resolving. But then the issue has not found its way into any of the bilateral meetings, so far. Why do you think this has happened, and and how should the two countries go about resolving this, eventually?

[00:26:23] - [Speaker 2]
So I agree with you that the dispute on our boundary, 98% of which has been resolved and strip maps have been signed, only relates to Kalapani and Susta, and this had been accepted by both sides. Now what happened in 2020 is that Nepal suddenly enlarged its claims to include Lipulek Pass and Limpiadhura. And this was a claim that went back to the year 1817, soon after the Sogoli Treaty was signed, and this claim had been rejected by the British Governor General, and it had not been raised in two hundred years. So now suddenly we are faced with the situation where Nepal has a much larger claim on our territory. Not only that, Nepal has also changed its border understanding and agreement with China because now according to the New Nepalese claim, the Nepal China border has shifted westwards of the present point.

[00:27:28] - [Speaker 2]
So this is something that India cannot accept because unilaterally something has been done which has not been done for two hundred years and no justification has been given for this claim. That's point number one. Point number two, if you look at it from India's perspective, today you say this is our territory and you make a new map and say this is our territory, and then you say that, okay, now I'm prepared to negotiate with you. Why should we accept that? It's like some countries, for instance, in the South China Sea, you take over some islands, you develop some bases and you put some people over there and say, know, this is ours.

[00:28:09] - [Speaker 2]
Now we are prepared to discuss it. So you can't change the status quo and then expand your claims and then say you're willing to discuss it. Thirdly, Nepal has gone for a constitutional amendment, which means two thirds of your parliament has supported the new claim. You have changed your map. Now with what authority will a Nepalese delegation discuss with India?

[00:28:33] - [Speaker 2]
Because we don't know whether what your delegation discusses will be endorsed by your parliament. So unless there is some sort of commitment or guarantee from your parliament that your delegation has full powers and what your delegation agrees will be endorsed through a constitutional amendment by the parliament. How do we move forward? So I'm afraid the boundary issue has got very entangled and very complicated, and I don't see how this is going to be resolved in the near future. Of course, eventually, it has to be resolved through dialogue and negotiations, but right now, I think it's become very complicated.

[00:29:13] - [Speaker 1]
Well, I think Nepal government had mentioned that Indian side was not reciprocating to its reservations about road being built in the disputed territory back then, then Home Minister, I think Rajnath Singh had inaugurated one of the roads that was leading into the disputed territory, which created quite an uproar on Nepali's side. Do you think that was a trigger point that, entangled the whole dispute? Because that was a time when the balloter relationship were also, you know, quite strained at at different levels, especially the constitution was, drafted. Do you think that that was a trigger point and perhaps, you know, leading to what eventually happened on the Nepali side?

[00:29:54] - [Speaker 2]
Perhaps in retrospect, I feel that, yes, we should have taken cognizance of the notes verbal that Nepal had issued and started some conversations or some discussions. And I am aware that before your map was amended, there was an effort on the part of India to have some dialogue or discussion, but perhaps from the Nepalese side, it was too late. It was too late. But, yes, perhaps in hindsight, had we, you know, started discussing this matter before the precipitate action of amending the map had been taken, may have been better. But, you know, that was also the time of the COVID pandemic and so on.

[00:30:38] - [Speaker 2]
And, of course, thereafter, the matter got entangled in domestic politics of Nepal and so became very complicated.

[00:30:45] - [Speaker 1]
Talking about long standing irritants, you've also argued that, two countries should reset their ties by reviewing or revising the 1950, Nepal Friendship Treaty, similar to what India did in light of its evolving relationship with Bhutan. From what we hear, the proposition was also made in the report, submitted by the eminent persons group that was formed by the two countries some time back, which unfortunately has not been received by the Indian side. But as we see it, there seems to be a reluctance, on the Indian side to take on this issue. What is your understanding of this?

[00:31:22] - [Speaker 2]
So my belief is that any treaty to be effective must have the interests of both sides. So you have to have two sides to a treaty. If Nepal's interests are accommodated, India's are not, it won't work. If India's interests are accommodated, Nepal's are not, it won't work. So clearly, a treaty to be meaningful has to accommodate interests of both countries.

[00:31:47] - [Speaker 2]
Now, Nepal doesn't like the 1950 treaty for various reasons. They have said it was an old treaty, it was unequal because it was signed by the Prime Minister of Nepal and ambassador of India and various other reasons. There are security clauses which Nepal doesn't like. Not that these have been spelt out explicitly, but that's my understanding. So fair enough.

[00:32:10] - [Speaker 2]
So we need to discuss. And government of India's position was stated very clearly by prime minister Modi in his banquet speech when he came on his first bilateral visit in August 2014. And he said, look, we are prepared to do anything. If you don't like the treaty, you want to abrogate it, you can do it in terms of the treaty. There is a clause which says you can abrogate it.

[00:32:32] - [Speaker 2]
If you want to amendment amend the treaty, we are prepared to look at the amendments that you propose. So we are open to whatever you wish to do on the treaty. And now I'm told I haven't seen the group the eminent persons group report, but I'm told that the fundamental aspect of that report is really on the 1950 treaty. And I think it's important that the two countries start a discussion on the 1950 treaty and find out some understanding when Nepal's interests and India's interests. India's interests relate to security, Nepal's interests relate to equal treatment and some of the defence cooperation, etc.

[00:33:17] - [Speaker 2]
So I'm sure we can find common ground and develop something that is acceptable to both India and to Nepal. You referred to Bhutan, and I've referred to it in my book, but I have had received so many critical comments from my Nepalese friends that how can you compare Nepal with Bhutan. So I am very reluctant to say that we should follow the Bhutanese example. But all I was trying to say is that, look, with Bhutan, we have very close relation and we have been able to reach a new understanding. So similarly with Nepal, I'm sure if the two sides sit down, if the two foreign secretaries sit down, we will be able to come up with a treaty which accommodates the concerns of both Nepal and India.

[00:34:06] - [Speaker 2]
And the sooner we start a discussion, the better. Why should we delay?

[00:34:10] - [Speaker 1]
Exactly. I mean, my reference to Bhutan was in a context that Bhutan was quite unhappy, in the later days, before the treaty was, you know, revised. So in reference to how Nepal has been quite keen on revisiting those treaties of 1950, there is, of course, commitment made by Prime Minister Modi at the top political level. But when it comes to actually, you know, sitting down and, you know, ironing out the differences and initiating the process, that has been quite delayed. That is what I I was referring to.

[00:34:43] - [Speaker 2]
So there, I agree with you. It has been delayed. I don't think the foreign secretaries have met perhaps once they met. So it's important that the foreign secretaries convene on the question of the 1950 treaty and see how to move forward. I think it's critical.

[00:34:58] - [Speaker 2]
Why leave this irritant? You know, in in in in India, we are saying, for instance, the UN Security Council is no longer representative. It was set up in 1945. Today, the world is different. It has to change.

[00:35:10] - [Speaker 2]
You know, India and other countries have to be permanent members. So Nepal is saying, look, this is such an old treaty. World has changed. So let's look at it. So it's a fair point, and I think, the two countries should immediately start, discussing this.

[00:35:22] - [Speaker 1]
So the other contentious issue in, Nepal India bilateral relationship has been the China factor. While India does have, genuine security concerns regarding China's, assertive presence, in South Asia, and it is also true that governments or regimes, not just in Nepal, but also in larger South Asia region have, from time to time, played what we call China card in their geopolitical balancing act. But tell us, should New Delhi also consider the fact that Nepal's relationship with Beijing and especially with Tibet, bitter or sweet, is also historical and therefore deep?

[00:36:00] - [Speaker 2]
So one correction, Nepal has had a very robust relationship with Tibet historically. In 1949, China took over Tibet. So suddenly, Nepal now had China on its border. And if you recall, in 1949, I think your government was very concerned about these developments and what China had done in Tibet and the implications of that for the whole region. And that is one reason why the 1950 treaty between our two countries was signed.

[00:36:33] - [Speaker 2]
Of course, over a period of time, as the world has changed, Nepal has changed, China has changed, India has changed, so the way we look at each of these countries and our relationships has changed. And today, I think Nepal sees China as the land of opportunity, especially in terms of economic prosperity, economic cooperation and so on, and that's very valid. Nepal has every right to develop its develop its economic partnership with China. As far as India is concerned, the India China relationship has also seen a lot of ups and downs. And right now, the India China relationship is is is at a low point following the incidents in Ladakh that happened, you know, sometime ago.

[00:37:25] - [Speaker 2]
And obviously, this influences the manner in which India looks at China. So obviously, at one level, see China expanding its footprint all over the globe including in South Asia. And, you know, on the economic side, we know that's a natural progression that's going to happen. But there are certain aspects of this expansion of Chinese influence which obviously impinge on Indian security. And I think as neighbors with open borders, Nepal should be sensitive to these concerns that India may have.

[00:38:04] - [Speaker 2]
And I think that is only reasonable. That is a reasonable expectation, I think, on the part of India that given the kind of relationship India and Nepal share, Nepal will be cognizant of India's security concerns.

[00:38:19] - [Speaker 1]
Well, we've discussed all major facets of Nepal India relationship over this conversation, the affinities, the partnerships, the tensions, and the suspicions. As per your own proposition in the book, how do we go about resetting ties between the two countries that are so close, not just in terms of geography, but also in terms of culture and kinship? And yet, they are constantly suspicious of each other's intentions and ambitions at the geopolitical levels. Do you see identifiable blockages, irritants that can be tackled mutually? Or is it just an inherent nature of this relationship to be complicated and messy?

[00:39:00] - [Speaker 2]
Well, there is a lot of historical baggage. So at one level, I feel that the relationship will be messy. But our job as diplomats is to ensure that even in this messy relationship, we move forward and strengthen our partnership. That is the strategic goal. And I think, as I said earlier, it is the economic dimension that we need to focus on.

[00:39:23] - [Speaker 2]
So we really need to step up our connectivity and economic partnership and integration in the sub region as a whole through hydropower cooperation and many other aspects. So that's point number one. Point number two, Nepal and India are both young countries. We have new generations of leaders. We have the youth that is aspirational.

[00:39:45] - [Speaker 2]
Aspirational. In the old days, most Nepalese would, for instance, study in India. Today, are many opportunities China, Australia, UK, USA. So India has to step up its act. We have to do much more to reach out to all sections of society.

[00:40:04] - [Speaker 2]
And I'm not only referring to political parties. I'm referring to civil society organizations. I'm referring to the media, and in particular, I'm referring to the youth. So I think India's public diplomacy has to, you know, really step up to the plate because, you know, that is where the future is. And finally, the political problems in our relationship, the irritants that you refer to, we must find some via media of trying to resolve them.

[00:40:37] - [Speaker 2]
Because if we don't resolve them, they keep lingering and they become more complex, and then they also factor into the domestic political discourse and debates, and they don't really benefit anyone. So we must find some way of addressing these issues, these irritants in the relationship.

[00:40:59] - [Speaker 1]
Well, you are in town at a very interesting time when the new elections are already scheduled. Where do you see Nepal India relationship headed in the light of new geopolitical realities in South Asia, Nepal's own developmental ambitions as well as India's aspirations as an emerging power?

[00:41:21] - [Speaker 2]
I think the world is in a very difficult place right now. You have this war conflict going on in The Ukraine. You have US China contestation for global influence. You have a situation where Russia and China are drawing closer together and are pitted against the so called Western countries. You have a situation where the India China relationship is in trouble, is in difficulty, and Nepal is witness to all this.

[00:41:54] - [Speaker 2]
You know, we have seen the whole debate on The US sponsored Millennium Challenge Corporation projects and the bickering between US and China on some of these issues relating to BRI and MCC. So it's all very visible and it's impacting countries, and countries are finding it difficult to balance all these various diverse relationships. So it's a very difficult time globally. So I think it's important for our region. It's very important for our sub region to pull together.

[00:42:31] - [Speaker 2]
We need to work together. We need to insulate ourselves from the negative the negative, how shall I say, influences that are emerging because of these contested and conflictual relationships, how to insulate ourselves. So I think if we all come closer together and especially economically, we will do much better. We will be stronger and we will be in a better position to deal with some of these very turbulent winds that are blowing internationally.

[00:43:08] - [Speaker 1]
That's a very thoughtful note to end. Ambassador Ray, it has been an engaging conversation. Thank you very much.

[00:43:13] - [Speaker 2]
Thank you.

[00:43:17] - [Speaker 0]
Thanks for listening to Podsby PEI. I hope you enjoyed the conversation between Anurag and Ambassador Ray on India's evolving role in Nepal, the details about Ambassador Ray's engagement with Nepal and its messy politics, and his proposition on how to reset the Nepal India ties. Today's episode is a part of PEI series on managing India, China and The US in a new world order. It was produced by Nirjhun Rai with support from Saudhub Lama. The episode was recorded at Mint Studio and edited by Nirjhun Rai.

[00:43:48] - [Speaker 0]
Our theme music is courtesy of Rohit Shakyo from Din Dabad. If you liked today's episode, please subscribe to our podcast. Also, please do us a favor by sharing us on social media and leaving a review on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, or wherever you listen to the show. For PEI's video related content, please search for policy entrepreneurs on YouTube. To catch the latest from us on Nepal's policy and politics, please follow us on Twitter tweettopei.

[00:44:19] - [Speaker 0]
That's TWEET followed by the number two and PEI and on Facebook policyentrepreneursinc. You can also visit pei.center to learn more about us. Thanks once again from me, Kushi Hang. We will see you soon in our next

[00:44:35] - [Speaker 1]
episode.